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THE ADAM WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND
SAFETY ACT: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASPECTS OF THE NEW CIVIL COMMITMENT LAW
FOR FEDERAL SEX OFFENDERS
JOHN FABIAN*
ABSTRACT
The Adam Walsh Act (AWA) became law on July 27, 2006, and is the most
expansive and punitive sex offender law ever initiated by the federal government.
One aspect of the statute, and the topic of this article, is the civil commitment of
federal sex offenders. The AWA civil commitment law has its roots in prior U.S.
Supreme Court cases including Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane. 1 While
the federal commitment statute is similar to traditional state commitment laws, the
AWA does not provide for a finding of “likely” to commit sex offenses. Rather, the
statute defines a “sexually dangerous person” as having “serious difficulty refraining
from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.” Assessing the
likelihood of recidivism and volitional impairments leading to sexual recidivism in
light of the AWA and state commitment statutes are critical determinations. The
accuracy, validity, and interrater reliability of the measurement of volitional
impairment is considerably lacking among experts and within the empirical literature
of sex offending in general. Similarly, examining the legal terms “mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder” under the AWA will entail a thoughtful application of
clinical psychiatric diagnoses recognized in the mental health profession. Many of
these psychiatric diagnoses (primarily paraphilias) utilized in legal commitment
proceedings are debated by adversarial expert witnesses in these hearings. As the
AWA pertains to federal sex offenders, the expert witness must consider their
differences from state sex offenders, as many of the former group are more likely to
*
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have histories of online solicitation and child pornography possession in their
criminal backgrounds.
Keywords: Adam Walsh Act, sexually violent predator, civil commitment, risk
assessment, volitional impairment, child pornography, paraphilias, psychopathy
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Congress recently passed the most comprehensive sex
offender law in U.S. history. This statute, the Adam Walsh Act (AWA),2 is a
comprehensive federally initiated sex offender law responding to political and public
concern about keeping society safe from sex offenders. The law represents high
profile victims such as Adam Walsh, Megan Kanka, Dru Sjodin, and Jessica
Lunsford and incorporates far reaching procedures that the government perceives
will prevent other high profile sex offenses from occurring.
While the AWA has many aspects including an emphasis on enhancing penalties
for sex crimes, establishing new federal sex offenses, and creating a national sex
offender registry database, this Article will focus on one element of the statute,
namely the civil commitment of federal sex offenders. The author will briefly outline
the U.S. Supreme Court landmark sex offender civil commitment cases, Kansas v.
Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane,3 which lay the foundation for federal civil
commitment. In addition to discussing the legal principals of the AWA and
comparing them to current state civil commitment statutes, the author will consider
the AWA’s language with the science of sexual violence risk assessment. Particular
attention will be paid to the assessment of volitional impairment in sex offenders as
the AWA does not specifically delineate a finding of “likely” to commit sex
offenses. Instead, the statute defines a “sexually dangerous person” as “a person
who has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child
molestation and who is sexually dangerous to others.”4 Being “sexually dangerous
to others” means having “serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct
or child molestation if released.”5 A finding of likelihood of sexual recidivism is a
constitutional mandate outlined in Hendricks, and the field of forensic psychology
and psychiatry is making gains in risk assessment examining likelihood of sexual
recidivism. However, the field of risk assessment is lacking consistent empirical
support defining volitional impairments relevant to a threshold for legal civil
commitment. The author will comment on diagnostic dilemmas that experts face in
sexual offender civil commitment proceedings. The differentiation of federal sex
offenders from state sex offenders will be explored as federal offenders are more
likely to have a history of non-contact sex offenses and convictions for online
solicitation and child pornography possession.
II. ADAM WALSH ACT CIVIL COMMITMENT LAW
In addition to focusing on creating harsher sentencing and penalties for federal
sex crimes, the AWA’s legislative intent was to protect society from high risk and
dangerous federal sex offenders. Pursuant to this aim, and the crux of this Article,
the AWA incorporates the first federal law for the civil commitment of sex offenders
in the U.S. through its traditional civil commitment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4248. The
statute has legislative objectives including allotting funding to states that are
2

Adam Walsh Act (AWA), 42 U.S.C. § 16911 et seq. (2006).

3

Fabian, supra note 1, at 1374-78; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Kansas v.
Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).
4

18 U.S.C. § 4142(a)(5) (2006).

5

18 U.S.C. § 4142(a)(6) (2006).
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considering or already entertaining civil commitment laws and to mandating the civil
commitment of sexually dangerous federal offenders.6
Considering the former objective, about twenty states currently have
implemented civil commitment statutes confining sexually violent predators and
many states that have not elected to do so often reject bills due to various reasons.
The cost of implementing such treatment programs and funding for legal
representation and expert witnesses to evaluate the offenders has led many states to
consider harsher sentencing laws for sex offenders on the front end rather than
commitment laws for those about to be released. The AWA considers these state
level concerns and provides federal funding for states who wish to implement
commitment statutes.
Important to the primary objective of the AWA civil commitment law appears to
be protection of society and treatment/rehabilitation. The AWA authorizes the
Attorney General or any individual authorized by the Attorney General or the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons to attempt to certify any sex offender who is in the
custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), who has been committed to the
custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), or against whom
all criminal charges have been dismissed solely due to the mental condition of the
offender as a sexually dangerous person.
In order to initiate commitment proceedings, the BOP must provide evidence
based on a clear and convincing standard that a particular offender is a sexually
dangerous person.7 A “sexually dangerous person” means that the defendant “has
engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation and
who is sexually dangerous to others.”8 The definition of sexually dangerous to
others “means that the person suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder as a result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from
sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.”9
The statute does not define the terms “sexually violent conduct” or “child
molestation,” and the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, is presently
attempting to interpret them in part through federal criminal statutes. 10 Further, the
6

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (West 1998).

7
See Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,205, 43,205
(Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 549, subpart H).
8

18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(5) (2006).

9

18 U.S.C. § 4247(a)(6) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 549.94 (2008).

10

Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,206. See
Memorandum for All Regional Directors and Wardens (Sept. 28, 2007) (on file with U.S.
Dep’t of Justice Fed. Bureau of Prisons). The BOP has considered interim procedures for
implementation of AWA civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons, definitions of
sexually violent conduct including the use or threatened use of force against the victim;
threatening or placing the victim in fear that the victim or any other person will be harmed;
rendering the victim unconscious and engaging in conduct of a sexual nature with the victim;
administering to the victim by force or threat of force or without knowledge, substances
impairing the victim’s ability to appraise control or thought; engaging in such conduct with a
victim who is incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct, or physically or mentally
incapable of declining participation in or communicating unwillingness to engage in that
conduct; engaging in any conduct of a sexual nature with another person with knowledge of
having tested positive for HIV or other potentially life-threatening sexually-transmissible
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AWA does not define the terms “serious mental illness,” “abnormality,” or
“disorder.”
The BOP’s first step of determining evidence of sexually violent conduct or child
molestation includes gathering information from the Pre-Sentence Investigative
Report, Statement of Reasons, Criminal Judgment, and other resources indicated in
28 C.F.R. § 549.90(c).11 Further records the BOP may consider include, but are not
limited to, information from civil and criminal proceedings, information obtained by
U.S. Attorney offices, federal and non-federal authorities, statements and admissions
by the offender, and medical records. The determination of whether the offender is a
sexually dangerous person includes a forensic examination by a psychologist or
psychiatrist pursuant to the statute’s psycho-legal criteria.
The BOP Certification Review Panel Guidelines include: (1) a behavioral
element (engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child
molestation); (2) a diagnostic element, including possible diagnoses not limited to
pedophilia, sexual sadism, paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS) non-consent,
hebephilia, etc.; sexual disorder; antisocial personality disorder; and personality
disorder NOS; and (3) a risk element that the inmate will have serious difficulty
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation.12 The risk element
includes a review of risk factors related to sex offending and can include
documented patterns of behavior, statements made during treatment and actuarial
assessment data used to determine sexual recidivism. Further, the Guidelines
support the clinical adjustment of actuarial instruments that add incrementally to the
predictive accuracy of the actuarial method with various aggravating and mitigating
factors.13
Federal offenders who are found incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by
reason of insanity, or other offenders who have at some time demonstrated sexually
violent conduct or child molestation through past charges or dismissed charges (does
disease without the informed consent of the other person. The BOP considers a definition of
child molestation, including any unlawful conduct of a sexual nature with a person under
eighteen years of age.
11

Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person, 28 C.F.R. § 549.90(c) (2008).

12

Memorandum, Bureau of Prisons, supra note 10.

13
See generally id. (stating that the Guidelines support clinical adjustments to actuarial
risk assessment data with the following information: evidence of significant victim injury,
torture, or death; forcible confinement of victims; evidence of sadistic behavior including
paraphernalia such as rape kits and torture devises or other methods indicating sadistic
behavior; evidence of statements of future intent or plans to commit sexual offenses or
exploitation; behavioral evidence of paraphilic sexual activity, compulsion, or gross sexual
dysregulation; evidence of psychopathy and PCL-R score of twenty-seven or greater; evidence
of deviant sexual arousal as measured by penile plythesmography; sex offender treatment
failure; and history of violation of supervised release). Mitigating factors to be considered
include completion of a sex offender treatment program demonstrating knowledge of sex
offender treatment skills; advanced age—sixty years of age or older and when remaining
community supervision covers a substantial portion of person’s remaining life; chronic and
severe medical condition diminishing risk of sex offending, i.e., impotence and sexual
dysfunction; absence of a pattern of sex offending; cases in which the offender’s sex offense
history is in the remote past and when there is no history of offending during the last 15 years,
especially when the offender was living in the community for long periods without sex
offending.
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not mandate that sex offender conduct be based on a current conviction), can be
considered for commitment. In essence, the current crime for which the offender is
serving a period of incarceration does not need to be a sexually related offense.
Rather, the offender can have a prior sex offense in his record and a current
nonsexual offense, or he can have demonstrated sexually inappropriate behavior
while in prison, and these acts can be the justification for the implementation of
commitment proceedings.
Accordingly, when considering the definition of a sexually dangerous person, “it
is not necessary that a person have been charged with or convicted of any criminal
act related to the conduct being considered—a limitation that could prevent a mental
health professional from considering probative and relevant evidence such as longestablished patterns of behavior, admissions of criminal activity previously
undetected by authorities, and statements of intent to commit future sexually violent
crimes or acts of child molestation.”14 In essence, under the AWA, the BOP grants
the forensic examiner wide latitude in the amount of collateral information he can
consider when assessing for difficulty in refraining from violent sex offending even
if this information is not based on formal charges/convictions.
After the government has initiated a certification for commitment of a federal
offender under the AWA, the commitment process becomes adversarial in nature.
The court may request a psychiatric and/or psychological examination of the
defendant to be conducted and the subsequent report(s) be filed with the court.15 The
adversary hearing process includes a determination by the court and not through a
civil jury trial, by clear and convincing evidence burdened by the government, as to
whether the offender meets the sexually dangerous person criteria.16 If the civil
respondent (formerly criminal defendant) is found to meet criteria, then he will be
committed to the custody of the Attorney General and placed within a sex offender
management or treatment type facility.
When considering detention and treatment of federal sex offenders, the BOP
provides for sex offender management programming that monitors offenders but
does not formally provide treatment. The AWA mandates the BOP to provide
appropriate treatment to sex offenders who are in need of rehabilitation and who are
appropriate for such treatment.17 One of the main treatment programs will be located
at Federal Medical Center Fort Devins, Massachusetts. Many of the sex offenders
who will be petitioned for potential civil commitment may not have been offered sex
offender treatment programming during their incarceration and will only be able to
participate after they are found to be commitment eligible.
Before the offender is discharged from commitment, the court will order a
hearing to determine whether the offender should be released based primarily on
treatment success and risk assessment.18 The legal threshold for release into the
14

Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person, 72 Fed. Reg. at 43,207.

15

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 4247(b) (West 2006). After filing the certificate, the inmate’s release
depends on a decision of the merits and the offender will continue to be detained even beyond
his release date.
16

18 U.S.C.A. § 4248(d) (West 2006).

17

18 U.S.C.A. § 3621(f)(1) (West 2008).

18

18 U.S.C.A. § 4247(h) (West 2006).
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community includes a preponderance proof standard that the offender is no longer
sexually dangerous to others or will not be sexually dangerous to others if released
under a prescribed regiment of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or
treatment.
The AWA statutory guidelines leave many unanswered questions. The law does
not establish a standard or burden of proof for risk to reoffend and does not permit a
jury trial. The law does not conclude whether the respondent has a right to remain
silent and does not mandate him to participate in a court ordered examination. The
AWA does not resolve discovery procedures, does not distinguish whether attorneys
should incorporate the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, does not provide for a
probable cause determination for proceedings, nor does it provide for periodic
annual reviews and examinations. The AWA does not describe procedures before
the offender is released. It allows for the indefinite commitment pursuant to the
traditional commitment law under 42 U.S.C. § 4248, and it does not delineate least
restrictive treatment/placement alternatives.
Before analyzing the statutory language of the AWA civil commitment scheme,
the author will discuss critical legal foundations stemming from two landmark cases
that grant constitutional support to federal civil commitment, including the U.S.
Supreme Court holdings in Kansas v. Hendricks19 and Kansas v. Crane.20
A. Kansas v. Hendricks and Crane
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a history of U.S. sex offender
civil commitment laws. However, readers must be reminded of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s monumental holdings in Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane. In
Hendricks, Leroy Hendricks had a remarkable history of child molesting type
offenses towards boys and girls and was diagnosed with paraphilic disorders
including pedophilia and exhibitionism. He admitted to being unable to control his
urge to molest children and refused to participate in sex offender treatment. In
Hendricks,21 the Court upheld a Kansas law providing for the civil commitment of
sex offenders who engaged in harmful predator sexual offending in the past,
currently suffer from a mental abnormality including a mental illness and/or
personality disorder, and because of this mental abnormality or personality disorder,
posed as being likely to engage in future predatory acts of harmful sexual
reoffending.22
The Court articulated that the indefinite commitment condition was not punitive;
rather, its objective was treatment of the offenders’ mental abnormality and
personality disorders to diminish their likelihood of future dangerousness.23 Further,
the Court supported the legal definitions of “mental abnormality” and “personality
disorder” as satisfying “substantive” due process requirements. This finding

19

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).

20

Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002).

21

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 355.

22

See id. at 371. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (West 1996).

23

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363.
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ultimately thinned offenders eligible for confinement to those who are unable to
control their dangerousness.24
In Kansas v. Crane, the Court again heard similar issues, but was asked to take
another look at Kansas’s commitment act by focusing on mental abnormality and
volitional requirements leading to sex offending behaviors.
The Court
acknowledged that in Hendricks it was not asked to set a formal volitional
requirement associated with the amount of control a person might lack over his sex
offending behaviors in order to qualify for commitment. The Court in Crane
considered that the “nature” and “severity” of the mental disorder “must be sufficient
to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but
typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.”25
Michael Crane, unlike Leroy Hendricks, suffered primarily from an antisocial
personality disorder (APD) as well as exhibitionism, rather than a primary paraphilic
disorder as did Hendricks. Crane argued that if the state was to commit a personality
disordered individual, this individual must have a volitional impairment and be
unable to control his sexually violent offending patterns.26 The Court in Crane held
that in order to civilly commit a sex offender, the person’s mental abnormality or
personality disorder must cause the individual to have “serious difficulty in
controlling behavior,”27 rather than “total or complete lack of control.”28 This
distinction is a key issue to the evaluation of sexual dangerousness. The Court
attempted to differentiate the typical sexual recidivist to the volitionally impaired
recidivist. The latter qualifying for commitment.
While it is true that the holding in Crane concerned the definition of “mental
abnormality” as causing serious difficulty in controlling behavior, the future
dangerousness factor outlined in Hendricks continues to be the constitutional
prerequisite even after Crane. The issue of volition and assessment of sexual
violence is pertinent to the topic of this paper as the AWA requires an assessment of
an offender’s lack of control. Before the Article examines this issue, the author
presents a list of several current state sex offender civil commitment laws as they
compare to the AWA requirements.
B. How Do States Handle Civil Commitment?
Nearly twenty states have implemented sexually violent predator (SVP) civil
commitment statutes. Table 1 includes a sampling of four state SVP statutes and the
AWA civil commitment scheme characterized by the name of the statutes, their

24

Id. at 358.

25

Crane, 534 U.S. at 413; see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2902(b) (West 2000) (stating
the definition of “mental abnormality” includes a congenital or acquired condition affecting
the emotional or volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent
offenses in a degree constituting such person to menacing the health and safety of others).
26

In re Crane, 7 P.3d 285, 287 (Kan. 2000).

27

Crane, 534 U.S. at 407.

28

Id. at 411.
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definitions of a sexually violent predator, definitions of the criteria for mental
abnormality, and legal thresholds for commitment. Table 1:
Jurisdiction
SVP Statute
Mental abnormality
A mental condition
Florida
A sexually violent predator is any
394.91229
person who: (a) has been convicted of affecting the person’s
a sexually violent offense; and (b) emotional or volitional
which
suffers from a mental abnormality or capacity
personality disorder that makes the predisposes the person to
person likely to engage in acts of commit sexually violent
sexual violence if not confined in a offenses.
secure facility for long-term control,
care, and treatment.
A
congenital
or
Washington
Any person who has been
condition
71.09.02030
convicted of or charged with a crime acquired
of sexual violence and who suffers affecting the emotional or
from a mental abnormality or volitional capacity which
personality disorder which makes the predisposes the person to
commission
of
person likely to engage in predatory the
acts of sexual violence if not confined criminal sexual acts in a
degree constituting such
to a secure facility.
person a menace to the
health and safety of
others.
Arizona
Mental disorder . . . a
A sexually violent person: (a) has
36-370131
personality
ever been convicted of or found guilty paraphilia,
or
conduct
but insane of a sexually violent disorder,
or
any
offense or was charged with a disorder
sexually violent offense and was combination of paraphilia,
determined incompetent to stand trial; personality disorder, or
and (b) has a mental disorder that conduct disorder that
makes the person likely to engage in predisposes a person to
commit sexual acts to
acts of sexual violence.
such a degree as to render
the person a danger to the
health and safety of
others.
New York
Means a congenital or
A person who is a detained sex
10.0332
condition,
offender suffering from a mental acquired
abnormality involving such a strong disease, or disorder that
predisposition
to
commit
sex affects the emotional,
offenses, and such an inability to cognitive, or volitional
control behavior, that the person is capacity of a person in a
likely to be a danger to others and to manner that predisposes
29

FLA. STAT. § 394.192(10), (5) (2008).

30

WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(18), (8) (2009).

31

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3701 (2010).

32

N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.03(e), (i) (McKinney 2011).
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commit sex offenses if not confined
to a secure treatment facility.

AWA

“Sexually dangerous person”
means that the defendant has engaged
or attempted to engage in sexually
violent conduct or child molestation
and who is sexually dangerous to
others.

[Vol. 60:307

him or her to the
commission of conduct
constituting a sex offense
and that results in that
person having serious
difficulty in controlling
such conduct.
Serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder
as a result of which he
would
have
serious
difficulty refraining from
sexually violent conduct
or child molestation if
released.

When reviewing the civil commitment standards of select states, their criteria are
similar. However, the State of New York and the AWA, being the two most recent
civil commitment laws in the U.S. at the time of this Article’s preparation, both
adhere to the Crane holding requiring a finding of volitional impairment—”serious
difficulty refraining from” found in the AWA and “inability to control behavior” and
“serious difficulty controlling” as listed in the New York statute. The other state
statutes primarily require a commitment threshold as being “likely” to commit future
sexual offenses.
C. A Comment on Defining Psychiatric Terms Within Legal Language
In the wake of Hendricks and Crane, courts, experts, and attorneys are burdened
with attempting to define various ambiguous terms relevant to the commitment of a
sex offender such as “likely” and “mental abnormality.” Importantly, forensic
examiners and lawyers handling these civil commitment cases have joined in
consensus that formal psychiatric diagnoses outlined in the DSM-IV-TR are required
to substantiate legal mental abnormality. The common statutory language in SVP
statutes, “congenital/acquired condition” affecting “emotional/volitional capacity”
alludes to a psychiatric diagnosis listed in the DSM-IV-TR. In California, the SVP
statute refers to “diagnosed mental disorder,”33 Minnesota34 and North Dakota35 refer
to “sexual disorder,” Arizona refers to “paraphilia,”36 while Nebraska refers to
“mental illness.”37 This agreement amongst legal and mental health professionals
causes strenuous debate about the fortitude of these diagnoses.
Critical to this discussion, the term “mental abnormality” is a legal term rather
than a psychiatric idiom which usurps psychiatric terminology to achieve a social

33

See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6609 (Deering 2011).

34

MINN. STAT. § 253B.02(18c) (2011).

35

N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-01(8) (2011).

36

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3701(5) (LexisNexis 2011).

37

See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-1204 (LexisNexis 2011).
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and political result.38 To simplify matters, the Court ruled in Crane that any
psychiatric diagnosis and the severity of the mental abnormality itself, must be
sufficient to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender whose serious mental illness,
abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but
typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case.39 These diagnoses in SVP
cases are centered around paraphilias such as pedophilia and exhibitionism as well as
personality disorders, namely antisocial personality disorder and the construct of
psychopathy.
Despite disagreement—by some experts and definitely by lawyers representing
sex offenders—that there is little interrater reliability among experts relevant to how
accurately and consistently examiners diagnose40 and come to similar conclusions,
courts will continue to rely heavily on experts’ diagnostic opinions in defining legal
mental abnormalities and disorders. Scholars have debated that diagnoses are not
particularly relevant to defining legal mental abnormality.41 Others have specifically
addressed the connection between the individual’s psychological impairment and the
legal criteria for eligibility of commitment rather than between the impairment and
the criteria for clinical diagnostic categories.42
38
Position Statement on Sexually Violent Predators Civil Commitment Legislation, N.Y.S.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.nyspsych.org/public/components/society
tools/admin/viewNewnews.asp?newsjob=ArticleID&ArticleID=6922&ArticleName=Position
+Statement+on+Sexually+Violent+Predators+Civil+Confinement+Legislation.
39

Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). See generally Wisconsin v. Post, 541
N.W.2d 115 (Wis. 1995) (holding that every condition is congenital or acquired and emotional
and volitional capacity describes decision making processes affecting how people act;
therefore, mental disorder under the statute means no more than a person’s predisposition to
engage in sexually violent conduct). One can assume that a person’s mental disorder is
derived from their past sex offenses.
40

Lea H. Studer & A. Scott Aylwin, Pedophilia: The Problem with Diagnosis and
Limitations of CBT Treatment, 67 MED. HYPOTHESES 774, 777 (2006).; see, e.g., Terence W.
Campbell, Challenging the Evidentiary Reliability of DSM-IV, 17 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL.
47, 47-68 (1999); Stuart A. Kirk & Herb Hutchins, The Myth of the Reliability of DSM, 15 J.
MIND & BEHAV. 71, 71-86 (1994); Jill S. Levenson, Reliability of Sexually Violent Predator
Civil Commitment Criteria in Florida, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 357, 362 (2004); William L.
Marshall & Steven J. Hucker, Issues in the Diagnosis of Sexual Sadism, 1 SEX OFFENDER
TREATMENT 4, 6 (2006); William O’Donohue, Lisa G. Regev & Anne Hagstrom, Problems
with the DSM-IV Diagnosis of Pedophilia, 12 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 95, 95105 (2000); Richard Wollert, Poor Diagnostic Reliability, the Null-Bayes Logic Model, and
Their Implications for Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations, 13 J. PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
167, 174 (2007).
41

See Stephen Morse, Law and Mental Health Professionals: The Limits of Expertise, 9
PROF. PSYCHOL. 289, 396 (1978); Stephen Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An
Analysis of Mental Health Law, S. CAL. L. REV. 526, 530 (1978) (espousing that the field of
psychology and psychiatry has not demonstrated special knowledge concerning the relation
between the observed symptoms and the specific behaviors that are related to the law’s
questions and concerns). Experts’ opinions about specific functional abilities and behaviors
are not based on any specialized knowledge about the relations of the symptoms or diagnoses
to the functional abilities in question.
42

See Robert F. Schopp & Barbara J. Sturgis, Sexual Predators and Legal Mental Illness
for Civil Commitment, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 466, 466 (1995) (stating that psychiatric diagnoses
describe behavioral symptoms of disorders, and many of these symptoms are present within
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In the face of strenuous debate on this issue, courts will likely accept any
psychiatric diagnosis that is recognized in the “medical or psychiatric literature”43
despite their vagueness. Diagnoses addressing sexual deviance and antisocial
behavior are included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental
Disorders44 and provide descriptive lists of behavioral requirements for each
diagnosis. If experts refused to utilize the DSM-IV-TR for example, they would
have to rely on the offender’s past behaviors relevant to commitment, i.e., offenses,
which in part define the clinical diagnoses. Importantly, the DSM-IV-TR provides
behavioral symptomatology for a diagnosis but does not define the intensity required
for such a diagnosis.
In addition to the acceptance of antisocial personality disorder as a diagnosis
associated with the commitment of sex offenders, courts will also accept the
construct of psychopathy reformulated and enhanced by psychologist, Dr. Robert
Hare,45 as it also appears in the psychological literature pertaining to its etiological
link to criminality and sex offending.46
When commenting on the ambiguity of the term “mental abnormality,” courts
similarly have not clinically defined other psycholegal terms such as
“incompetency” or “insanity.”47 In fact, the Court commented in its Hendricks
ruling that “mental illness” is devoid of any talismanic significance as “psychiatrists
disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness.”48 The Court
opined, “[I]f it were shown that mental abnormality is too imprecise a category to
the offenders’ criminal and sex offending behaviors). Therefore, diagnoses are an imperative
component to civil commitment determinations.
43
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-22, Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (Nos.
95-1649, 95-9075).
44
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC
DISORDERS 701 (4th ed. 2000).
45

AND

STATISTICAL MANUAL

OF

MENTAL

Robert Hare, Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY
(Brian L. Cutler ed., 2008).

AND LAW

46
See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 997 (Wash. 1993); Jeffery Abracen, Jan Looman &
Calvin M. Langton, Treatment of Sexual Offenders with Psychopathic Traits: Recent Research
Developments and Clinical Implications, 9 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 144, 144-66 (2008);
Calvin M. Langton et al., Sex Offenders’ Response to Treatment and its Association with
Recidivism as a Function of Psychopathy, 18 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 99, 106;
Jan Looman et al., Psychopathy, Treatment Change, and Recidivism in High-Risk, High-Need
Sexual Offenders, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 549, 554 (2005); Mark E. Olver & Stephen
C. P. Wong, Psychopathy, Sexual Deviance, and Recidivism Among Sex Offenders, 18
SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 65, 69 (2006); Ralph C. Serin, Donna L. Mailloux & P.
Bruce Malcolm, Psychopathy, Deviant Sexual Arousal, and Recidivism Among Sexual
Offenders, J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 234, 235 (2001); Michael C. Seto & Howard E.
Barbaree, Psychopathy, Treatment Behavior, and Sex Offender Recidivism, 14 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1235, 1236 (1999).
47

George Smith Hamilton, The Blurry Line Between “Mad” and “Bad”: Is “Lack-OfControl” a Workable Standard for Sexually Violent Predators?, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 481, 482
(2002).
48

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1997) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68, 81 (1985)).
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offer a solid basis for concluding that civil detention is justified, our precedents
would not suffice to validate it.”49
The Washington State Supreme Court provided a helpful legal opinion on this
topic of defining psychiatric terms within the legal arena in In re Young.50 The court
held that “[o]ver the years, the law has developed many specialized terms to describe
mental health concepts. For example, the legal definitions of ‘insanity’ and
‘commitment’ vary substantially from their psychological and psychiatric
counterparts.”51 “In using the concept of ‘mental abnormality’ the legislature has
invoked a more generalized terminology that can cover a much larger variety of
disorders . . . What is critical for our purposes is that psychiatric and psychological
clinicians who testify in good faith as to mental abnormality are able to identify
sexual pathologies that are as real and meaningful as other pathologies already listed
in the DSM.”52
The key issue is that expert witnesses on both sides testify in good faith and this
is always subject to question given the adversarial nature of our court system.
When we contemplate the evaluation of AWA cases we must focus on the
language of the statute. The language follows the holding of Crane and mandates an
evaluation of volitional impairment in addition to the prerequisite finding of
likelihood of reoffending pertinent to the holding in Hendricks. The AWA requires
a mental illness, abnormality, or disorder which results in the person having serious
difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation. When
considering the legal language, similar to other state statutes, the offenders
qualifying for federal commitment will likely qualify for pedophilia due to the
numbers of federal offenders with child pornography and child sex crimes.
Secondary diagnoses of exhibitionism, paraphilia not otherwise specified (NOS),
non-consent (rape) subtype and hebephilia subtype, antisocial personality disorder,
and a finding of psychopathy will also be considered as commitment
diagnoses/constructs.53
D. Defining Volitional Impairments and Distinguishing “Serious Difficulty
Refraining” from “Likely”
Many of the state civil commitment statutes include a “likely” to reoffend
component. The expert witness’s business of risk assessment in state cases is
49

Id. at 373.

50

In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1001 (Wash. 1993) (quoting Alexander D. Brooks, The
Constitutionality and Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 709, 733 (1992)).
51

Id. at fn. 5.

52

Id. at 1001.

53

See Jack Vognsen & Amy Phenix, Antisocial Personality Disorder Is Not Enough: A
Reply to Sreenivasan, Weinberger, and Garrick, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 440, 441
(2004) (discussing that, despite the holding in Crane supporting a commitment of offenders
whose serious difficulty refraining is caused by antisocial personality disorder, many experts
do not believe and will not opine or testify to the recommendation of commitment for an
offender based only on an antisocial personality disorder diagnosis). Similarly, other experts
will not agree that a paraphilia disorder nonconsent rape type exists within the psychiatric
nomenclature.
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typically founded in legal statute by determining the likelihood of future acts. As
mentioned, despite the holding in Hendricks outlining a constitutional “likelihood”
requirement, the AWA does not mention the term likely; rather, it incorporates
Crane terminology of volitional impairment. As reviewed in Crane, the Court ruled
that a potential sex offender being considered for commitment need only be found to
have a mental abnormality or disorder that makes it “difficult, if not impossible, for
the [dangerous] person to control his dangerous behavior.”54 The Court held that the
SVP standard required a substantial loss of volitional impairment, rather than a total
loss of control because the latter could not be demonstrated with mathematical
precision.55 Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court estimated that the existence of a
mental abnormality or personality disorder that causes a likelihood of sexual
recidivism thereby establishes the requisite difficulty if not impossibility of control
over one’s behavior.56
The question of whether one’s likelihood of future sexual recidivism and one’s
volitional impairment are the same is a fascinating inquiry. Interestingly, in many
state civil commitment hearings in which the state has a likelihood threshold of
future dangerousness, trial court judges do not allow the experts to testify to Crane
volitional impairment opinions.57 In essence, the judges are adhering to the
“likelihood” language of their particular statute developed by the respective
legislature, rather than allowing the jury to consider the specific volitional language
in Crane.58
The holding in Crane leaves federal courts hearing AWA commitment cases with
many unanswered questions. How does a federal court define “serious difficulty
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released?”59 Should
the court presume that likely and serious difficulty refraining are the same? If so,
how does a federal court define likely? It may be argued that likely means more than
likely (greater than 51%). It may also be debated that having serious difficulty
54

Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 583 (2000).

55

Id. at 413.

56

Id. at 407.

57
This comment is based on this author’s evaluation and testimony experience in sexually
violent predator civil commitment proceedings.
58

See Florida v. White, 891 So. 2d 502, 507 (Fla. 2004) (holding that the defendant
requested the court instruct the jury that to be civilly committed, the defendant had to be
unable to control his dangerous behavior). The Supreme Court of Florida cited the U.S.
Supreme Court’s opinion in Crane which does not require a specific volitional impairment
jury instruction, but rather proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior in order to be
civilly committed. See also In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 100 (Iowa 2003); In re
Civil Commitment of Ramey, 648 N.W.2d 260, 263 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). A few states
have found that Crane imposes an affirmative additional duty to determine lack of control and
two states found that the jury must be instructed that the respondent must have serious
difficulty controlling behavior.
59
See Crane, 534 U.S. at 423 (Scalia, A., dissenting) (questioning how the majority
opinion defines an offender’s inability to control sex offending behaviors when considering
features of the case and the nature of psychiatric diagnosis and the severity of the mental
abnormality: The law “gives trial courts not a clue in how they are supposed to charge a
jury!”).
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refraining means the offender is more than likely to sexually reoffend. If a court
applying Crane questions the mathematical precision in assessing inability to
control, should expert witnesses incorporate mathematically based actuarial risk
assessment instruments in their sex offender assessments when attempting to address
volitional impairments in AWA commitment hearings? Simply, the Court’s
assumption that the qualitative and quantitative assessment of substantial loss of
control has more mathematical precision is seriously questioned by mental health
professionals.
When addressing this latter question, the AWA statute does not require the use of
these instruments to assess risk of future sex offenses, but the BOP encourages their
use.60 Experts may utilize these instruments to assess the volitional threshold of
commitment and will also attempt to obtain other information including the
offenders’ offense record and self-report of other crimes, number of victims,
fantasies, behaviors etc., that are related to assessing paraphilia diagnoses associated
with volitional impairment.
The AWA’s legislative intent recognizes the U.S. Supreme Court volitional
language found in Crane. The intent may include avoiding the use of terms such as
“likely” and “substantial probability” because they do not lend themselves to
percentages or numerical exactness very easily in its statutory definition. However,
the federal courts hearing AWA cases may still consider qualifying the ambiguous
language of “serious difficulty refraining from future sexual violence and child
molestation” through assessments of likelihood of future risk of sex offending since
the likelihood language is recognized in Hendricks.
Some state courts have not translated “likely” into a statistical probability.61
Other courts have understood likely to mean “highly probable”62 or “substantial
danger that is, a serious and well founded risk,”63 and even have distinguished
between likelihood of recurrence of sexual misconduct, the likely frequency of any
such behavior, and the magnitude of harm to other persons that is likely to result.
When assessing volitional impairments, courts have historically struggled with
the qualification and quantification of such a construct and its relationship to
behavior. Following the John Hinckley insanity trial in which psychiatric experts
battled about Hinckley’s ability to control his behavior with a history of delusions,
the American Bar Association (ABA) and the American Psychiatric Association
(APA) advocated for the abolition of the American Law Institute’s (ALI) volitional
insanity prong. The APA stated, the “line between an irresistible impulse and an
impulse not resisted is probably no sharper than that between twilight and dusk.”64
The ABA criticized volitional tests by noting there is no valid or reliable basis for
measuring incapacity for self-control.
60

See Civil Commitment of a Sexually Dangerous Person, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,205, 43,206
(Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 549, subpart H).
61

Commonwealth v. Boucher, 780 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Mass. 2002).

62

In re Detention of Wilber W., 53 P.3d 1145, 1151 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).

63

People v. Superior Court (In re Ghilotti), 44 P.3d 949, 954 (Cal. 2002).

64

Insanity Defense Work Group, American Psychiatric Association Statement on the
Insanity Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983); see also John Q. La Fond, The
Future of Involuntary Civil Commitment in the U.S.A. After Kansas v. Hendricks, 18 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 153, 156 (2000).
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Laws that address volitional impairments lead to psychiatric disagreement, error,
and interrater reliability issues as there is “no way to calibrate the degree of
impairment of behavioral controls.”65 Critics argue that the Crane Court’s “serious
difficulty” rule assumes that people have freewill, yet one author asserts, “[t]he
science of the mind simply has not advanced far enough to permit experts to know
with any confidence what decisions were ‘controllable’ and which ones were not.”66
Conversely, some argue that clinicians can assess cognitive and volitional standards
pertaining to the insanity defense for example, with some degree of interrater
reliability.67 The problem is not only assessing interrater reliability, but the accuracy
and validity of what we are trying to measure and whether we can precisely measure
volition.
Statutes, case law, and clinical behavioral data do not provide a clear conception
of what we are trying to identify and measure when we assess volition and freewill.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons has been working on creating, in a sense, user
guidelines and suggestions relevant to the assessment of sex offending issues as
applied to the AWA civil commitment statute, and in particular whether an offender
has a “serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child
molestation if released.”
The BOP indicates that a mental health professional may consider any of the
following information (not an exhaustive or complete list) pertaining to serious
difficulty refraining:
1. to the person’s repeated contact, or attempted contact, with one or more
victims;
2.

to the person’s denial of or inability to appreciate the wrongfulness,
harmfulness, or likely consequences of engaging in sexually violent
conduct or child molestation;

3.

to, established through interviewing, and testing of the person, or other
risk assessment tools, that are relied upon by mental health
professionals;

65
Richard Bonnie, Morality, Equality, and Expertise: Renegotiating the Relationship
Between Psychiatry and the Criminal Law, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 17
(1984); see ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 202 (Jules Coleman ed.,1991); Stephen J. Morse,
Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (1994) (stating that people can
exercise control over their behaviors when they have well developed self awareness and self
monitoring, fear consequences of their negative behavior, display accurate cognitive
perception and rational reasoning, desire moral behavior, have control over emotions, exhibit
empathy for their behaviors, have the ability to suppress desires, and exert good judgment and
practical wisdom).
66

David L. Faigman, Making Moral Judgments Through Behavioural Science: The
‘Substantial Lack of Volitional Control’ Requirement in Civil Commitments, 2 L. PROBABILITY
& RISK 309, 315 (2003).
67

Richard Rogers, APA’s Position on the Insanity Defense, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 840, 840
(1987).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss2/3

16

2012]

THE ADAM WALSH CHILD PROTECTION AND SAFETY ACT

323

4.

to, established by forensic indicators of inability to control conduct,
such as:
a) offending while under supervision
b) engaging in offense(s) when likely to get caught
c) statement(s) of intent to reoffend, or
d) admission of inability of difficulty to control behavior; or
e) indicating successful completion of, or failure to complete, a sex
offender treatment program.
These factors may intuitively tap into some issues that lead to volitional
impairment, however, are any of them empirically associated with difficulty
controlling or refraining? For example, having multiple victims as outlined in the
first item may indicate evidence of sexual deviance. The second item appears to
address the issue of legal insanity such as appreciating wrongfulness and
consequences of one’s sex offending acts. The third item suggests that an expert’s
use of risk assessment instruments might assist in assessing degree of impairment of
one’s serious difficulty in refraining. Finally, the fourth item includes some
descriptive elements that in common sense appear to relate to inability to control
one’s sex offending but they are doubtfully related scientifically to the AWA
volitional construct.
These items provided by the BOP will likely fail in defining one’s serious
difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation because these
premises lack a clear conception of what we are trying to measure and identify.68
However, courts will likely accept expert testimony that is relevant and offered in
good faith despite many experts’ exhaustive discourses on the theoretical
components of volitional impairment.
E. A Closer Look at Expert Witness Assessment of Volition
Pertinent to the AWA it is important to address how experts evaluate sex
offenders’ inability to control their sex offending behaviors.
There are no formal psychological and even neuropsychological assessment
instruments that will provide certain answers to the processes by which an individual
decides on and actually commits a particular behavior. The psychological literature
provides no clear cut definitions on how we should measure self-control, freewill
and volition.69 Most theories are quantitative in nature, implying degrees to which
individuals possess self-control and elements that influence self-control.70 Further,
while many experts and scholars view self-control as being associated with criminal
behavior, it is not clear whether individuals abandon self-control or ultimately lose
control and therefore if the concept may be considered on a continuum. Self control
68

Robert F. Schopp, Mario J. Scalora & Marc Pearce, Expert Testimony and Professional
Judgment: Psychological Expertise and Commitment as a Sexual Predator After Hendricks,
15 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 120, 127 (1999).
69

PHILIP WITT & MARY ALICE CONROY, EVALUATION OF SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS
31 (2009).
70

Cynthia Calkins Mercado, Robert F. Schopp & Brian H. Bornstein, Evaluating Sex
Offenders Under Sexually Violent Predator Laws: How Might Mental Health Professionals
Conceptualize the Notion of Volitional Impairment?, 10 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 289,
302 (2005).
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and freewill over behavior superimposes criminal behavior including the traits of
impulsivity, risk taking, lack of empathy, poor behavioral controls, immediate
gratification, deficits in considering consequences of behavior, low frustration
tolerance, and lack of insight.71
Scholars have been thoughtful in considering elements pertaining to volitional
impairment.72 Evaluators should assess whether the offender’s sexual offending has
an enduring driven quality and lacks the ability to make meaningful choices. Does
the offender disregard personal consequences and minimize consequences of his
offending behaviors? Is the offender able to delay sexual gratification for long
periods of time? Does the offender verbalize a lack of control, have a chronic and
lengthy history of sexual offending, lack offense planning, and commit some of their
offending while under the influences of substances which ultimately inhibits his
behaviors?
Significant concern has been raised about the lack of empirical support regarding
whether persons diagnosed with paraphilias and/or personality disorders are unable
to control their behavior.73 Human behavior is a complex phenomenon based on a
combination of affective, motivational, and cognitive elements. An offender’s
choice to repeatedly act on aberrant desires does not provide evidence of volitional
impairment.74
Recently, researchers investigated legal professionals, psychologists, and mock
jurors germane to their decision making of volitional impairment in hypothetical
sexually violent predator proceedings.75 Results indicate that these participants
heavily considered the offenders’ history of sexual violence, verbalized lack of
control over sex offending behavior, history of planning and premeditation of the
offenses, and the context of the civil commitment hearing while discounting the
effects of substance abuse on offending behaviors.
Experts are challenged with determining whether a sex offender is lacking in
ability or will to control. These questions are not subject to quantifiable terms and
answers. For example, utilizing actuarial risk assessment instruments includes
incorporating a mechanical procedure which overlooks the clinically complex
elements of assessing volitional abilities in relationship to the offender’s mental
abnormality.76 Simply, one cannot equate high scores on actuarial risk assessment
instruments with one’s ability to control or not control their behaviors because one
cannot generalize from the many to the individual. The sex offender normative
71

Id. at 305.

72

Cynthia Calkins Mercado, Brian Bornstein & Robert Schopp, Decision-Making About
Volitional Impairment in Sexually Violent Predators, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 587, 590
(2006); see also RICHARD ROGERS & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF FORENSIC
PRACTICE: MENTAL HEALTH AND CRIMINAL LAW 348 (2005).
73

Stephen J. Morse, Fear of Danger, Flight from Culpability, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 250, 263(1998). See generally Calkins Mercado et al., supra note 70, at 305; Schopp &
Sturgis, supra note 42, at 440; Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic
Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 505, 521 (1998).
74

Robert F. Schopp, Civil Commitment and Sexual Predators: Competence and
Condemnation, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 323, 342 (1998).
75

See Calkins Mercado et al., supra note 72, at 591.

76

See ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 72.
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samples on these instruments and the sex offenders we evaluate and compare to
these norms all have different etiological pathways and emotional, cognitive, and
behavioral processes that led to their offending. Some offenders scoring high on
actuarial risk assessment instruments may indeed be high risk offenders, yet willfully
choose their criminal sex offending behavior and not possess significant problems
refraining from their acts.
Let us briefly examine a clinical case example. Consider a sex offender who is
sexually interested only in children and he has a mental condition, pedophilia, which
creates drives that are unbearable and overriding. He has a history of numerous sex
offending behaviors against children that are frequent and persistent. He suffers
from abnormal sexual fantasies towards children and frequently masturbates to these
fantasies until climax. He seeks out children to fulfill his masturbatory fantasies
even when at risk to do so and even after being imprisoned on a few prior occasions.
This offender may be considered by some to lack volition and most pedophiles
would not likely qualify in this category. Those less deviant pedophiles may fall in
the “typical recidivist” category and simply choose to commit their crimes against
children rather than lacking an ability to control and will to control.
As one author describes the atypical offender child molester who would qualify
for commitment,
hypersexual severity, which makes this man’s psychological
condition a SVP-relevant ‘mental disorder.’ . . . [T]his man’s
deviant interest is the current behind his sexual offending. The
hyper-sexuality provides the voltage. It is the voltage, not the
current, ‘overpowering’ this man’s ability to use the switch and
restrain sexual behavior. Our TSR [typical sexual recidivist] has the
same current but not the same voltage; he can use his switch if he
chooses . . . It is this man’s hyper-sexuality that drives his paraphilia
to the point where he is ‘made’ dangerous beyond typical criminal
volition . . . . 77
When considering diagnostic issues, one’s particular diagnosis may explain little
of his functional capacity pertaining to volition over his behavior.78 Just because one
suffers from pedophilia does not mean that he is that functionally impaired.
Although most individuals who are committed will ultimately qualify for a
paraphilic diagnosis, the key issue in determining volitional impairment is to address
in what ways the mental condition interferes with behavioral control.
Researchers who study Florida civil commitment detainees79 assert that in
Florida, no diagnosis by itself meets the legal threshold for commitment because it
must be also demonstrated that the individual is likely to commit future acts of
sexual violence. Therefore, a combination of a diagnosis predisposing the person to
sexual violence, and a finding of “likely” to commit future sexual violence are
required in that state and neither factor alone are sufficient to justify commitment.
77

Daniel F. Montaldi, The Logic of Sexually Violent Predator Status in the United States
of America, 2 SEXUAL OFFENDER TREATMENT 1, 14 (2007).
78

Id. at 15.

79

Levenson, supra note 40, at 364.
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Similarly, when considering AWA commitments, the statute includes both a
finding of mental illness, abnormality, or disorder and a finding of serious difficulty
from refraining from sexually violent conduct or acts of child molestation. As we
know, the terms “mental illness,” “abnormality,” or “disorder,” are legal definitions
written into the AWA law as conditions required for commitment. The mere
presence of any of these terms is not legally sufficient to commit someone; rather,
the condition must predispose the offender to future serious difficulty refraining in
their sexual behavior. Critically, one’s clinical psychiatric diagnoses as displayed
through his behavioral, cognitive, and emotional processes may not only predispose
him to reoffending, but overpower his volitional capacities to not reoffend. If an
offender simply chooses to continue to reoffend, then he should not qualify for
commitment.
Scholars have attentively considered factors relevant to volition that should be
addressed in AWA hearings despite some of their ambiguous empirical connections
to willfulness: 80
1) Lack of choicefulness (investigate evidence of planning or rational
decisions);
2) Disregard for personal consequences (offended without any regard for
personal consequences and failed to reduce likelihood of their
apprehension);
3) Incapacity for delay (inability to delay sexual deviations and
gratification);
4) Evidence that sexual deviations formed a discernible and stable pattern;
5) Evidence of delusions and/or command hallucinations associated with
sexual deviations;
6) Evidence of manic based behavior associated with sexual deviations;
7) Evidence of uncontrollable impulses associated with severe paraphilias;
8) Evidence that the volitional impairment results directly in a risk of
sexual recidivism.
Other researchers have listed methods for determining the presence of volitional
impairment including: existence of personality disorder combined with previous sex
offending; existence or non-existence of a paraphilia; self report that volitional
impairment is present; neuropsychological testing indicating impaired impulse
control.81
One can argue that the simple presence of a paraphilia disorder, such as
pedophilia, makes a predisposition of volitional impairment obvious. However, the
80

See ROGERS & SHUMAN, supra note 72.

81

Rebecca L. Jackson & Derek T. Hess, Evaluation for Civil Commitment of Sex
Offenders: A Survey of Experts, 19 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 425, 436 (2007).
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strength of the deviant sexual drive and its relationship to inability to resist one’s
behavior is the important element.82
Scholars have also cited potentially promising areas of scientific inquiry
regarding diminished behavioral control with its roots being psychophysiological
and neurological in nature.83 Various brain abnormalities focus on frontal and
temporal lobe areas have been indicated to be associated with impulse control
dysfunction, deviant sexual behavior, and personality disorders, including
psychopathy.84
What makes this process of assessing will power so difficult is the lack of
empirical findings providing us with quantifiable definitions of volition.
Accordingly, one may question whether Leroy Hendricks’s admissions about not
being able to control his sexual urges and likelihood of acting on them again in the
future has any empirical foundation in his likelihood of future offending, or inability
to refrain from sex offense crimes in the future. However, most clinicians would
heavily weigh an offender’s admissions that he cannot control his sex offending
behaviors and would consider himself as high risk in their support for the offender’s
commitment.
Former Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger addressed the irresistible impulse
label—It “has always been a misleading concept because it has connotations of some
sudden outburst of impulse and completely overlooks the fact that people do a lot of
weird and strange and unlawful things as a result of not just sudden impulse but long
brooding and disturbed emotional makeup.”85
Similarly, the field of forensic psychology and psychiatry lacks reliable standards
in assessing and diagnosing volitional impairments.86 When considering court
82

DENNIS DOREN, EVALUATING SEX OFFENDERS: A MANUAL FOR CIVIL COMMITMENT AND
BEYOND 32 (2002).
83

See Holly A. Miller, Amy E. Amenta & Mary Alice Conroy, Sexually Violent Predator
Evaluations: Empirical Evidence, Strategies for Professionals, and Research Directions, 29
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 29-54 (2005).
84

See Antoine Bechara, Hanna Damasio & Antonio R. Damasio, Emotion, Decision
Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex, 10 CEREBRAL CORTEX 295, 306 (2000); R.J.R. Blair &
Lisa Cipolotti, Impaired Social Response Reversal: A Case of ‘Acquired Sociopathy,’ 123
BRAIN 1122, 1122-41 (2000); Jeffery Burns & Russell Swerdlow, Right Orbitofrontal Tumor
with Pedophilia Symptom and Structional Apaxia Sign, 60 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 437, 440
(2003); Kent A. Kiehl et al., Semantic and Affective Processing in Psychopaths: An EventRelated Potential (ERP) Study, 36 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 765, 770 (1999); Kent A. Kiehl et al.,
An Event-Related Potential Investigation of Response Inhibition in Schizophrenia and
Psychopathy, 48 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 210, 215 (2000); Adrian Raine et al., 1134, 1141
(2003); Jeffery L. Saver & Antonio R. Damasio, Preserved Access and Processing of Social
Knowledge in a Patient with Acquired Sociopathy Due to Ventromedial Frontal Damage, 29
NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 1241, 1245 (1991) .
85

GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS:
FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 67 (2nd ed. 1997).

A HANDBOOK

86
See Bradley Grinage, Volitional Impairment and the Sexually Violent Predator, 48 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 861, 862 (2003) (indicating that the field of psychiatry lacks a valid or reliable
method to infer a patient’s volitional capacity and no uniform clinical definition exists). The
medical literature describes volitional capacity loosely as impulse control and compulsive
behavior. The medical literature also alludes that elements of volition may be psychiatrically
evaluated.
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testimony in AWA cases, some scholars recommend that forensic examiners simply
describe symptom behavioral patterns and offender characteristics rather than offer
definitive opinions on volitional capacity because the construct is unknown and
ambiguous.87
F. Volitional Diagnostic Dilemmas: Paraphilias, Antisocial Personality Disorder,
and Psychopathy
There appear to be two camps of adversarial experts who hold contrary beliefs as
to the existence, reliability, validity, and utility of various psychiatric diagnoses
applicable in sex offender civil commitment proceedings. Essentially, defense
experts seriously question these diagnoses while prosecution experts utilize them
freely.
The AWA civil commitment cases will be burdened with many sex offenders
who suffer from pedophilia due to widespread federal child-related sex crimes
including possession of child pornography, online solicitation activity, and sexual
crimes against children. Despite this trend, this author will describe some
psychiatric diagnostic dilemmas typically found in civil commitment cases
throughout the U.S.
The most common diagnoses/constructs relevant to AWA proceedings, some
which are under heavy scrutiny by forensic mental health professionals, will likely
include:
1) Pedophilia;
2) Hebephilia;
3) Paraphilia Not Otherwise Specified-Nonconsent (rape subtype);
4) Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD);
5) Psychopathy (severe criminal personality);
6) Exhibitionism;
7) Substance abuse, dependency and intoxicated states.
As previously discussed, the issue of inability to control and the choice to not
control or lacking the will to control, similar to an irresistible impulse and an
impulse not resisted, will often lie within an offender’s diagnosis as labeled by an
expert witness. The finding of how functionally impaired the offender is relevant to
controlling his sex offending behaviors is paramount more so than only considering
the psychiatric diagnosis he carries.
There is a debate about whether intense, impulsive, and sometimes abnormal
sexual behaviors should be explained by conditions other than paraphilias.
Accordingly, some sex offenders who are diagnosed with paraphilias and lack some
control over their sexually deviant impulses are often viewed similarly to those who
suffer from obsessive compulsive disorders.88 Similarly, paraphilic disorders have

87

See Calkins Mercado et al., supra note 70, at 307.

88

Richard B. Krueger & Meg S. Kaplan, The Paraphilic and Hypersexual Disorders: An
Overview, 7 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRAC. 391, 399 (2001); see also Robert Barth & Bill Kinder, The
Mislabeling of Sexual Impulsivity, J. SEXUAL & MARITAL THERAPY 13, 15 (1997); Donald
Black, Compulsive Sexual Behavior: Area Review, 4 J. PRACT. PSYCHIATRY BEHAV. HEALTH
219, 223 (1998); Eli Coleman, The Obsessive-Compulsive Model for Describing Compulsive
Sexual Behavior, 2 J. PREVENTIVE PSYCHIATRY & NEUROLOGY 9, 13 (1990).
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been compared and contrasted to nonparaphilic hyper-sexuality disorders.89 Scholars
have argued that paraphilic disorders referred to as nonparaphilic sexual addictions,
hypersexual disorders, or sexual compulsivity include socially sanctioned sexual
fantasies, urges and activities (i.e., compulsive masturbation, pornography
dependence, cyber sex chat rooms) that increase in intensity and frequency as to
cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning.90
Paraphilias on the other hand are currently defined in the DSM-IV-TR as
“recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving
1) nonhuman objects, 2) suffering or humiliation of oneself or one’s partner, or 3)
children or other nonconsenting persons for a period of at least 6 months” that causes
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning.91
Important to this diagnosis is recent literature addressing the question of whether
a paraphilia can be based on behavior alone without evidence of sexual fantasies
and/or urges.92 The definition lists “sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or
behaviors,” suggesting that behaviors alone are sufficient for the diagnosis. Further,
the DSM-IV authors emphasized that it is behavior that most typically brings
individuals to clinical attention.93 However, the same authors have acknowledged a
mistake and urge for a correction in the DSM-V in that their intention was not to
allow the diagnosis of a paraphilia based on behavior (often criminal sexual
behavior) alone. Diagnosing a paraphilia based on behaviors alone would distort the
division between mental disorder and criminality and decisions pertaining to
indefinite commitment should not be based on a misreading of a poorly worded
DSM-IV listed symptom.94 These authors recommend a removal of the current
terms “or behaviors” and a reinstatement of the requirements of sexual urges and
fantasies.
This issue is a much contested concern because many SVP examiners only rely
on the police reports detailing the sexual crimes without any other support of a
paraphilic condition. In their defense, these experts may not have access to other
data, i.e., fantasies and masturbatory practices, given the tendency for offenders to
89
Martin P. Kafka & John Hennen, Hypersexual Desire in Males: Are Males with
Paraphilias Different from Males with Paraphilia-Related Disorders?, 15 SEXUAL ABUSE: J.
RES. & TREATMENT 307, 311 (2003).
90
Martin P. Kafka & John Hennen, The Paraphilia-Related Disorders: An Empirical
Investigation of Non-Paraphilic Hypersexuality Disorders in Outpatient Males, 25 J. SEX &
MARITAL THERAPY 306, 306 (1999); see Martin Kafka & Robert Prentky, A Study of
Nonparaphilic Sexual Addictions and Paraphilias in Men, 53 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 345,
347 (1992).
91

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 44 (discussing diagnoses including exhibitionism,
frotterism, sexual sadism, pedophilia, and voyeurism can be based on the person having acted
on paraphilic urges and do not require the person experiencing distress or impaired
functioning).
92

Michael First, Issues for DSM-V: Unintended Consequences of Small Changes: The
Case of Paraphilias, 39 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1240, 1240 (2008).
93

Id.

94

Id.
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not admit to these experiences during civil commitment examinations. In contrast,
an examiner could assume that one’s sexual behaviors are based in part by sexual
urges and these two elements together may comprise a paraphilia.
Importantly, some experts believe that only sex offenders who carry paraphilia
diagnoses should be committed as the disorders designate a deviant sexual
preference, whereas antisocial personality disorder is indicative of general
criminality and willful behavior and should not be cited as the sole disorder
supporting mental abnormality for commitment.95 However, some experts argue
that APD alone is a qualifying disorder for civil commitment.96
1. Antisocial Personality Disorder
Given the contradictory holding in Crane associated to volitional impairment and
its allowance for a sex offender to be committed based on an emotional disorder or
personality disorder, there has been heightened scholarly debate as to whether
antisocial personality disorder is enough to commit someone indefinitely.97 Many
APD sex offenders may not carry paraphilia diagnoses and their sex offending may
be one of the many antisocial behaviors in which they engage. In essence, the APD
diagnosis will likely not adequately differentiate the typical recidivist from the
atypical recidivist outlined in Crane and it does not completely address impairment
in volition as a diagnosis standing alone.
For example, consider a single middle-aged career criminal with a juvenile and
adult history of violent and nonviolent offenses and no history of sex offending. He
enters a house and during his burglary, he commits an opportunistic rape against a
stranger female occupant (offender takes goods of value and sex from the victim).
This sex offender will score high on some actuarial risk assessment measures in
major part due to his nonsexual criminal history despite only one detected sex
offense on record.
In contrast, consider a single middle-aged offender with prior nonviolent criminal
offenses and one prior rape offense who burglarizes a home with a specific intent of
finding a woman to rape. He collects her underwear and experiences sexual
gratification and pleasure in raping, ultimately demonstrating symptoms of
paraphilic behavior (falling short of a paraphilia diagnosis due to a six month
95

See Vognsen & Phenix, supra note 53. see also Patrick Lussier, The Criminal Activity of
Sexual Offenders in Adulthood: Revisiting the Specialization Debate, 17 SEXUAL ABUSE: J.
RES. & TREATMENT 269, 269 (2005) (the interested reader should also consider the generalist
versus specialist debate of sex offending). Some scholars question whether sex offenders are
specialists who tend to repeat sexual crimes or whether they are merely generalist criminals
who do not tend to restrict themselves to one particular type of crime.
96

Gregory DeClue, Paraphilia NOS (Nonconsenting) and Antisocial Personality
Disorder, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 495, 499 (2006); see also Adams v. Bartow, 330 F.3d
957 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that APD alone is sufficient enough to indicate that an
offender cannot control his sex offending and ultimately the diagnosis by itself can support
civil commitment); United States v. Wilkinson, No. 07-12061-MLW, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10628, at *29 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 2008) (stating that when considering the third
prong of a commitment proceeding under the AWA, APD alone as a disorder was not
enough to commit an individual). The court found that APD is not associated in the
literature with sex offending to such an extent as paraphilic disorders.
97

See Vognsen and Phenix, supra note 53, at 441.
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behavior requirement). This offender may have a similar actuarial risk score as the
former case, but yet be driven to rape by different causative pathways and possess
heightened deviant volitional impairments more so than the first offender.
The question in AWA proceedings will focus on which offenders experience
serious difficulty refraining from their sexually violent acts. It may be difficult to
prove that either one of these offenders has serious difficulty in refraining, yet a
finding of likelihood of reoffending based on actuarial estimates of probability could
very well occur in these cases.
Many offenders with APD are not sex offenders and the APD diagnosis does not
require sex offending behavior. In fact, about 60 to 80% percent of all prisoners
incarcerated in the U.S. meet diagnostic criteria for APD and many of them are not
sex offenders.98 With such high prevalence of the disorder within offender
populations, APD as a diagnosis may lack validity.99 Further, the thresholds for the
diagnosis provided by the DSM-IV are mostly unexplained, softly justified, and
recent investigation is questioning the discriminant validity of APD and personality
disorders in general within the DSM-IV.100 These offenders with APD have an
ability to exercise a choice more so than the sex offender who has a paraphilic sexual
deviancy disorder. Simply put, it can be argued that APD is a catchall diagnosis for
persons with socially problematic behavior and because it does little to distinguish
offenders, its validity is questioned.
2. Psychopathy
The dimension or construct of psychopathy101 (affective, interpersonal, lifestyle,
and behavioral components of a severe criminal personality), similar but yet distinct
from APD, is especially relevant to SVP proceedings because of its prevalence in
those high risk sex offenders who are ultimately civilly committed.102 Psychopathy
has been known to be correlated with outcomes of general criminal, violent, and to a
lesser degree, sexually violent behavior.103
98
THOMAS WIDIGER & ELIZABETH CORBITT, THE DSM-IV PERSONALITY DISORDERS 10910 (W.J. Livesley ed., 1995); Paul Moran, The Epidemiology of Antisocial Personality
Disorder, 34 SOC. PSYCHIATRY EPIDEMIOLOGY 231, 231, 233 (1999).
99

PAUL MORAN, ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER: AN EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
88 (1999).
100
DAVID J. KUPFER, MICHAEL B. FIRST & DARREL A. REGIER, A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR
DSM-V 123 (1999); Thomas. Widiger, An Empirically Based Classification of Personality
Pathology: Where We Are Now and Where Do We Go?, 14 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & PRAC.
94, 95 (2007).
101

Hare, supra note 45, at 87.

102

Rebecca L. Jackson & Henry J. Richards, Diagnostic and Risk Profiles Among Civilly
Committed Sex Offenders in Washington State, 51 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY 313, 315 (2007); see also Eric Janus & Nancy Walbek, Sex Offender
Commitments in Minnesota: A Descriptive Study of Second Generation Commitments, 18
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 5, 5-21 (2000).
103

See R. Karl Hanson & Andrew J. R. Harris, Where Should We Intervene? Dynamic
Predictors of Sexual Offense Recidivism, 27 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 6, 8 (2000); Ron Langevin
et al., Lifetime Sex Offender Recidivism: A 25-Year Follow-Up Study, CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY &
CRIM. JUST. 532, 533 (2004); Looman et al., supra note 46, at 550; James R. P. Ogloff,
Psychopathy/Antisocial Personality Disorder Conundrum, 40 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY
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The use of the instrument to assess psychopathic traits, (Psychopathy ChecklistRevised: PCL-R) is utilized by many experts and notably the highest risk offenders
may be the ones with a paraphilia and antisocial personality disorder diagnosis and
presence of significant psychopathic traits.
Although the personality dimension of psychopathy may show promise with its
link to sexual offending, its usefulness for the prosecutor may be more in its
prejudicial impact on the offender as a pejorative label. Current research tells us that
prosecution experts in SVP proceedings often find offenders to have higher levels of
psychopathic traits than defense experts. 104 The construct of psychopathy has
weaknesses including validity, test-retest stability and generalizability, life-course
stability, and comorbidity with other psychiatric diagnoses.105 Finally, psychopathy
can be characterized as a dimension of personality, thus its use in legal proceedings
is questionable because it is not listed in the DSM-IV-TR and one cannot be
diagnosed with it because it is not a formal psychiatric diagnosis.
When considering volitional impairment on behavior, some research informs us
that psychopaths have difficulty incorporating new environmental feedback into their
decision making, they are impaired with their abilities to inhibit their behavior, and
they suffer from low cortical arousal in their brain.106 In fact, researchers are citing
growing evidence that even psychopathic individuals have impairment in amygdala
functioning that leads to deficits in instrumental emotional learning, expression of
basic emotional reactions, attention, reward and punishment processing, and
socialization.107 Whether these psychopathic traits that have their roots in
biopsychosocial phenomenon can be accurately measured has yet to be seen.
519, 526 (2006); Vernon L. Quinsey, Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Actuarial Prediction
of Sexual Recidivism, 10 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 85, 91 (1995); Marnie E. Rice & Grant
T. Harris, Cross-Validation and Extension of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide for Child
Molesters and Rapists, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 232 (1997); R.J. Dempster, Prediction of
Sexually Violent Recidivism: A Comparison of Risk Assessment Instruments (1998)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Simon Fraser University) (on file at Simon Fraser University).
104
See Daniel C. Murrie et al., Does Interrater (Dis)agreement on Psychopathy Checklist
Scores in Sexually Violent Predator Trials Suggest Partisan Allegiance in Forensic
Evaluations?, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 352, 357 (2007) (showing that current research has
indicated that state and defense experts have significantly different Psychopathy Checklist
Revised scores of offenders they evaluate, as defense experts are more conservative and state
experts are more liberal with their scoring of the instrument). These results question whether
assessments are based in part by allegiance of the examiner with their retaining legal party.
105

See John Matthew Fabian, A Literature Review of the Utility of Selected Violence and
Sexual Violence Risk Assessment Instruments, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 307, 317 (2006);
Terence Campbell, The Validity of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised in Adversarial
Proceedings, 6 J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. PRAC. 43, 49 (2006); David Freedman, False Prediction
of Future Dangerousness: Error Rates and Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), 29 J.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 89, 89-95 (2001).
106

DAVID COOKE ET AL., PSYCHOPATHY: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
SOCIETY (1998); see Willem H. J. Martens, Antisocial and Psychopathic Personality
Disorders: Causes, Course, and Remission-A Review Article, 44 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY
& COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 406, 410 (2000).
107

JAMES BLAIR, DEREK MITCHELL & KARINA BLAIR, THE PSYCHOPATH: EMOTION AND THE
BRAIN 130 (David Cooke, Adelle Forth & Robert Hare eds., 2005).
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While it can be argued that psychopathy and APD are not disorders that fit into
the traditional medical model of involuntary civil commitment, scholars cite ample
legal opinion evidence to the contrary.108 Simply, the law answers the question as
legislatures are including the term personality disorder as a requisite condition for
civil commitment and many courts are agreeing that APD is enough in rendering
offenders likely to commit future sex offenses.109
The dilemma remains as to whether a personality disorder diagnosis alone and/or
the presence of psychopathy, qualifies a sex offender to have a serious difficulty
refraining from future sexual conduct.110 Offenders with APD and psychopathy have
control over most if not all of their behaviors and are considered unwilling to restrain
their impulses. Expert testimony should focus on sexual deviancy facets of APD
rather than opportunistic sex offending only. 111 Despite experts providing clinical
answers to this debate, the issue is subject to a legal answer, namely based on the
holding in Crane.112 Accordingly, personality constructs will often be admitted in

108
Shoba Sreenivasan, Linda E. Weinberger & Thomas Garrick, Expert Testimony in
Sexually Violent Predator Commitments: Conceptualizing Legal Standards of “Mental
Disorder” and “Likely to Reoffend,” 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 471, 476 (2003).
109

See Martin v. Reinstein, 987 P.2d 779, 803 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999); In re Commitment of
W.Z., 773 A.2d 97, 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); In re Detention of Brooks, 937 P.2d
486, 492 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
110

See In re Commitment of Taylor, 621 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000)
(supporting the association between antisocial personality disorder with sexually violent
behavior). The court cited the nexus was not between the disorder and the violent sexual act,
rather between the disorder and its specified effect on the individual to predispose him to
sexual violence. See also Commonwealth v. Reese, 438 Mass. 519, 526 (Mass. 2003)
(holding that a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder is adequate to satisfy the
definitional requirements of a sexually dangerous person set forth in G.L.C. 123A § 1); Judith
Becker & William Murphy, What We Know and Do Not Know About Assessing and Treating
Sex Offenders, 4 J. PSCYHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L., 116, 118 (1998) (stating sexual predator laws
should not be applied to nonparaphilic individuals). Some APD offenders may commit
occasional sex offenses as part of their offending patterns but they do not have a recurrent
pattern of sexually disordered behavior and are not appropriate for sexually violent predator
programs. There is clear evidence indicating that psychopathy is a risk factor for sexual
recidivism among paraphilic individuals.
111

See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 82-83 (1992).

112

Id. at 86-87 (reasoning that “the State asserts that because Foucha once committed a
criminal act and now has an antisocial personality that sometimes leads to aggressive conduct
. . . he may be held indefinitely. This rationale would permit the State to hold indefinitely any
other insanity acquittee not mentally ill who could be shown to have a personality disorder
that may lead to criminal conduct. The same would be true of any convicted criminal, even
though he has completed his prison term.”). See also John Kip Cornwell, Understanding the
Role of the Police and Parens Patriae Powers in Involuntary Civil Commitment Before and
After Hendricks, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 377, 397 (1998) (reasoning that most prison
inmates suffer from APD, constitutionalizing the commitment of those with antisocial
personalities would give states broad authority to civilly detain prisoners at the end of their
sentences).
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court to explain volitional impairments, ultimately satisfying requisites for
commitment.113
3. Paraphilia Disorder NOS (nonconsenting-rape type)
Another diagnostic dilemma occurring in SVP state civil commitment
proceedings is whether the diagnosis Paraphilia Not Otherwise SpecifiedNonconsent (rape subtype) exists as psychiatric diagnosis in the DSM-IV-TR. This
diagnosis is common amongst offenders qualifying for civil commitment in state
courts. In Arizona, this diagnosis has been found to occur in 56% of their SVP
proceedings while in Washington its prevalence is nearly 43%.114
Numerous examiners utilize this diagnosis to indicate that an offender has an
affinity to rape, enjoys raping, and obtains sexual arousal from raping yet does not
enjoy the repetitive infliction of suffering on the victim which would indicate
features of sexual sadism. Many practitioners endorse that a paraphilia nonconsent
diagnosis must include an ongoing clear and special lust for the aggressive taking of
sex and/or a sexualized hostility towards women causing distress and interpersonal
difficulty.115 However, in practice, many clinicians who endorse this diagnosis
substantiate it in their evaluations solely by the fact that an offender has two rape
incidences that occurred over a period of six months or longer, without any history
of sexually deviant fantasies or other information supporting a diagnosis beyond the
rape itself.
The DSM-IV-TR indicates in the definition of paraphilia—”children or other
nonconsenting persons,”116 yet the manual does not specifically endorse a rape
subtype relevant to nonconsenting adults who are raped. Further, the term
nonconsenting person was apparently meant to apply only to exhibitionism,
voyeurism, and sadism and not to adult rape victims.117 Subsequently, many
clinicians assume that an adult rape victim is a nonconsenting person, and if the
perpetrator has a pattern of this behavior (usually more than one nonconsenting
113
See Vognsen & Phenix, supra note 53, at 24. Mental health professionals will likely not
generally accept as a group that APD alone qualifies as a severe mental disorder justifying
civil commitment. Such opinions violate historical medical models to civil commitment of
those offenders who are mentally ill and dangerous. Given the controversy that surrounds
whether APD offenders are amenable to treatment and whether such treatment is efficacious
with such offenders, many experts will not support commitment unless there is a comorbid
sexual paraphilia. The authors warn that experts should not interpret the law by excluding
APD offenders from commitment.
114

Judith V. Becker et al., Characteristics of Individuals Petitioned for Civil Commitment,
47 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 185, 185 (2003). See Jackson &
Richards, supra note 102, at 320.
115

See Vognsen & Phenix, supra note 53, at 380; Witt & Conroy, supra note 69, at 34
(stating that a Paraphilia NOS nonconsent diagnosis is difficult to implement because there is
a problem in inferring sexual arousal to nonconsenting sexual interactions unless the offender
admits to it).
116

AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 44.

117

See Allen Frances, Shoba Sreenivasan & Linda E. Weinberger, Defining Mental
Disorder When It Really Counts: DSM-IV-TR and SVP/SDP Statutes, 36 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 375, 377 (2008) (highlighting that the DSM-IV-TR did not include rape as a
coded diagnosis or example of not otherwise specified (NOS) category).
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victim), he would qualify for the diagnosis. Other experts emphasize that deviant
sexuality need not be either obligatory or exclusive for a person to meet criteria for a
diagnosis of paraphilia not otherwise specified; rather, the repetitive coercive sexual
behavior alone is definitive enough for the diagnosis.118 However, it can be debated
whether the DSM-IV-TR dictates that repetitive rape cannot be justified on the basis
of behaviors alone, rather, these behaviors must be based on paraphilic urges and
fantasies associating the coercive sex to sexual arousal. One problem remains as to
whether this viewpoint endorses the repetitive sexual activity as being a product of a
paraphilia, substance intoxication disinihibition, opportunity, power, control, anger,
or APD. 119
Some experts believe the diagnosis is too broad, unreliable, imprecisely defined
and in essence, a “wastebasket” diagnosis.120 Utilizing the diagnosis may be
inappropriate as it is not formally listed in the DSM-IV or DSM-IV-TR, it does not
appear to fit with the intentions of the authors of the DSM, and there is no research
conducted to establish this diagnosis’s validity.121 Importantly, recent commentary
by authors of the DSM, indicate that “it was the deliberate intent of DSM-IV to
exclude any reference in DSM-IV to rape as a paraphilia. That is why rape is not
listed under the various examples of paraphilia NOS and is not listed in the DSM-IV
Index.”122 DSM-IV specifically did not include either rape or nonconsent as an NOS
118

Id.

119

HOWARD ZONANA ET AL., DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (1999); see AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, SEXUAL
DEVIANCE: THEORY, ASSESSMENT, AND TREATMENT (D. Richard Laws & William O’Donahue
eds., 1997) (stating that researchers have also opined that “nonconsenting persons” pursuant to
a paraphilia include only necrophiliacs (sex with corpses)).
120

Robert Prentky et al., Sexually Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Science on Trial, 12
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 357, 363 (2006).
121

See Miller et al., supra note 83, at 17; William L. Marshall, Diagnostic Issues, Multiple
Paraphilias, and Comorbid Disorders in Sex Offenders: Their Incidence and Treatment, 12
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 16, 17 (2007); Brown v. Watters, No. 06C0753, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 80064, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 15, 2007) (finding that sex offender expert Dennis
Doren admitted on cross examination that he coined the diagnosis Paraphilia Not Otherwise
Specified nonconsent diagnosis). He testified that neither the DSM-IV-TR or any professional
organizations for psychologists recognized this diagnosis. The court reasoned that legal
definitions of mental illness need not mirror those advanced by the medical profession. A
diagnosis that may not be recognized by the general medical community may still satisfy due
process. The fact that the diagnosis is not in the DSM-IV-TR nor is it readily recognized by
the psychology field in general did not answer the question of whether petitioner could control
himself. The court opined that while the diagnosis was novel, it appears to be consistent with
recognized diagnostic principles. See also Brief for the American Psychiatric Association and
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (No. 00-957), 2001 WL 873316. But see Frances et al.,
supra note 117 (stating that NOS categories in the DSM-IV-TR are designed to allow
clinicians to use their clinical judgment for each individual as to whether the symptom cluster
caused enough distress or impairment to be a mental disorder). The vagueness in guidelines
for NOS diagnoses was intentional to permit the clinician flexibility in their diagnostic
process.
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Allen Frances & Michael B. First, Paraphilia NOS, Nonconsent: Not Ready for the
Courtroom, J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 39:555–61, at 557 (2011).
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example, because paraphilic rapism had been considered and ruled out as a
paraphilia in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third
Edition (DSM-III), Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third
Edition, Revised (DSM-III-R), and DSM-IV. In conclusion, these authors indicate
that “rape is always a crime and is never, by itself, sufficient evidence of a mental
disorder.”123 Coincidentally, around the time of writing this Article, an article in the
Psychiatric Times dated May 12, 2011, by author Allen Frances, M.D., indicated that
the proposal to include coercive paraphilia as an official diagnosis in the main body
of DSM-V has been rejected by the American Psychiatric Association due in part to
insufficient reliability and validity of such a diagnosis.
When considering the DSM’s historical rejection of a rape paraphilia, a
Paraphilia Subcommittee was formed in the 1980s to make recommendations to the
DSM-III-R and they voted against a “paraphilic coercive disorder” due to the small
amount of offenders who would qualify for sexual arousal to a coercive assault and
the fact that the disorder could be used in forensic settings to exculpate rapists.124
Moreover, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) task force cites that the
DSM-IV has not classified paraphilic rapism as a mental disorder. They recognized
that some researchers believe that a small group of rapists have diagnostic features
similar to those with other paraphilias. However, it is unclear what percentage of
rapists would be diagnosed as having such a coercive paraphilic rape disorder, and
the ability to make the diagnosis with a sufficient degree of validity and reliability
remains problematic (there was insufficient empirical data to support the disorder).
Conversely, those supporting such a diagnosis cite other research indicating a
tendency for some rapists to be sexually aroused to nonconsenting sexual
interactions as measured by plethysmographic instruments.125 In fact, some research
has shown that about 60% of rapists show equal or greater arousal to rape stories
than to consenting sex stories compared to 10% of men with no history of rape.126
These data would suggest that there is a sexually deviant arousal pattern to
nonconsenting sexual interaction for some rapists and hence a paraphilia disorder
nonconsent type would be appropriate in some cases. This would also suggest that
some APD offenders who have an affinity to rape may not show deviant arousal
patterns in laboratory studies.
Ultimately, the paraphilia NOS nonconsenting condition is a weak construct
given a lack of a set of denied criteria and consequently there is a danger of using the
diagnosis as a catch-all diagnosis for offenders with a history of sex offenses for
whom the examiner cannot clearly identity a specific diagnostic category.127
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Id. at 560.
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See Frances et al., supra note 117, at 379.
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Martin L. Lalumiere & Vernon L. Quinsey, The Discriminability of Rapists from NonSex Offenders Using Phallometric Measures, 21 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 150, 150-175 (1994).
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4. Pedophilia
One of the most common diagnoses that is easily identified and supported
amongst state civilly committed sex offenders is pedophilia. In Florida, about 39%
of the offenders committed carry this diagnosis,128 while in Minnesota, about 35% of
the committed offenders were diagnosed the same.129 About 63% of committed sex
offenders in Arizona were diagnosed with pedophilia130, while about 59% of those
committed in Wisconsin carry the disorder.131
Important to the substance of this Article is the fact that most sex offenders being
considered for federal civil commitment via the AWA will have child victims either
through hands-on offending across state lines, possession of child pornography, or
solicitation pursuant to a child or adolescent victim. Consequently, experts will be
asked to determine the presence or absence of pedophilia in order to substantiate or
reject the diagnosis as the mental disorder, abnormality, or disorder required for
commitment.
Recently there has been strenuous debate on the utility of the diagnosis of
pedophilia.132 For example, an area of disagreement of experts is whether pedophilia
and other paraphilias qualify as mental disorder and genuine psychopathology.133
When considering the reliability and validity of the paraphilias, there has been
question on the psychometric quality of the diagnosis of pedophilia.134 Particular
attention has been paid to the problems with interrater reliability and test-retest
reliability of the diagnosis.135 Debates have centered around the ambiguous terms of
“recurrent” and “intense” within the criteria as well as the consistency of clinicians
to accurately assess whether behaviors, urges, and fantasies cause distress or
impairment. Though the diagnostic criteria for the disorder appears straightforward,
problems with the reliability of the disorder include the subjective manner in which
128
Jill S. Levenson, Sexual Predator Civil Commitment: A Comparison of Selected and
Released Offenders, INT’L. J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 189, 189 (2004).
129

Eric S. Janus & Nancy H. Walbek, Sex Offender Commitments in Minnesota: A
Descriptive Study of Second Generation Commitments, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 343 (2000).
130

Judith Becker et al., Characteristics of Individuals Petitioned for Civil Commitment, 47
INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 185, 189 (2003); see Jeffery Abracen &
Jan Looman, Evaluation of Civil Commitment Criteria in a High Risk Sample of Sexual
Offenders, 1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIV. COMMITMENT: SCI. & L. 124, 128 (2006). The authors
found that within their sample of civilly committed offenders in Canada, 19% were diagnosed
with pedophilia.
131

Letter from Thomas Zander, Psy. D, J.D. to author (Oct. 25, 2008) (on file with author).
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See Drew A. Kingston et al., The Utility of the Diagnosis of Pedophilia: A Comparison
of Various Classification Procedures, 36 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 423, 423 (2007).
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Richard Green, Is Pedophilia a Mental Disorder? 31 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 467,
467 (2002); Charles Moser, Are Any of the Paraphilias in DSM Mental Disorders?, 31
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 490, 490 (2002).
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Moser, supra note 133; Levenson, supra note 40, at 359; Nathaniel McConaghy,
Unresolved Issues in Scientific Sexology, 28 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 285, 285 (1999).
135
William L. Marshall, Diagnostic Problems with Sexual Offenders, in SEXUAL OFFENDER
TREATMENT: CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES 33, 41 (William L. Marshall et al. eds., 2006);
O’Donahue et al., supra note 40, at 98.
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information about sexual interests is combined by examiners and the dilemma
experts experience when assessing sex offenders against children as they often are
unwilling to admit to deviant sexual thoughts and practices.136
When considering the assessment of pedophilic interests, scholars have
developed a brief screening scale which includes the following variables: any male
victim, more than one victim, any prepubescent victims, and any extrafamilial
victims.137 These sex offense history variables were associated with phallometric
assessment data differentiating pedophiles from nonpedophiles.138
While roughly 50 to 70% of pedophiles can be diagnosed as having another
paraphilia such as exhibitionism or voyeurism, multiple paraphilia offenders are
more likely to commit future sex offenses. 139 While the prevalence of pedophilia
among men who commit sexual offenses against children is about 50%,140 pedophilic
child molesters on average commit about ten times more sexual offenses against
children than nonpedophilic child molesters.141 While only about 7% of pedophiles
identify themselves as exclusively sexually attracted to children, this exclusive type
is more likely to have a history of multiple child victims and are considered more
likely to sexually reoffend in the future.142 Research indicates that pedophiles who
offend boys are much more likely to have more victims and committed more
offenses than those who have offended against girls.143
5. Hebephilia
Relevant to the AWA, many federal sex offenders have hands-on, solicitation,
and pornography victims in this hebephilic (pubescent-post-pubescent) age group.
Importantly, hebephilia is not a paraphilia diagnosis recognized by the DSM-IV-TR

136
MICHAEL C. SETO, PEDOPHILIA AND SEXUAL OFFENDING AGAINST CHILDREN: THEORY
ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION 24-25 (2008).
137
Michael C. Seto & Martin L. Lalumiére, A Brief Screening Scale to Identify Pedophilic
Interests Among Child Molesters, 12 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 15, 16 (2001).
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Id.
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Gene G. Abel et al., Multiple Paraphilic Diagnoses Among Sex Offenders, 16 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 153 (1988); Lisa J. Cohen & Igor I. Galynker, Clinical Features of
Pedophilia and Implications for Treatment, 8 J. PSYCHIATRIC PRAC. 276, 281 (2002); Nancy
Raymond et al., Psychiatric Comorbidity in Pedophilic Sex Offenders, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
786, 787 (1999).
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SETO, supra note 136, at 8.
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GENE G. ABEL & NORA HARLOW, THE STOP MOLESTATION BOOK 9 (2001), available at
http://www.childmolestationprevention.org/pdfs/study.pdf.
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Id. at 11.
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Gene G. Abel et al., Self-Reported Sex Crimes of Nonincarcerated Paraphiliacs, 2 J.
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 3, 22 (1987). The authors found that among nonincarcerated
nonincest related pedophiles, heterosexual pedophiles on average reported abusing 19.8
children and committing 23.2 acts whereas homosexual pedophiles had abused 150.2 children
and committed 281.7 acts.
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and has come under recent brutal attack by some clinicians, challenging the
conception that sexual interests in pubescent minors imply a mental disorder.144
A key feature of the definition of pedophilia is the age and pubertal status of the
children of interest which has a typical age threshold of thirteen years. In contrast,
hebephilia is the sexual preference for pubescent children and often is considered
sexual preference for females ages thirteen to sixteen years of age145 or eleven or
twelve to fourteen years of age.146 The ability to distinguish pedophiles from
hebephiles concerns the problems with the variability and definitions of pubertal
onset in children and the decreasing age of pubertal onset.147 The DSM-IV-TR
draws the distinction between pathological age-related sexual preferences as adult
sexual arousal to prepubescent is considered pathological and adult arousal to
pubescent and postpubescent is non-pathological.
Pedophiles can be distinguished from hebephiles as the latter include a more
intense interest in having reciprocal sexual affairs or relationships with children; they
are more opportunistic in their offending, and they have better developed social
skills and better post-treatment progress than pedophiles.148
Current research has revealed that hebephilia exists as a discernable erotic agepreference apparently separate and distinct from pedophilia.149 Blanchard and his
colleagues studied men who verbally reported maximum sexual attraction to
pubescent children and found they had greater penile responses to depictions of
pubescent children than to depictions of younger or older persons.150 Therefore,
there was a remarkable consistency between the offenders’ self-reported age
preferences and their phallometric results.151 Penile responses distinguished these
men from those who reported maximum attraction to prepubescent children and
those who reported sexual attraction to adults.152 Some offenders have repeatedly
144

See Charles Moser, When is an Unusual Sexual Interest a Mental Disorder?, 38
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 323, 323 (2009); Philip Tromovitch, Manufacturing Mental
Disorder by Pathologizing Erotic Age Orientation: A Comment on Blanchard et al. (2008), 38
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 328, 328 (2009); Thomas K. Zander, Adult Sexual Attraction to
Early-Stage Adolescents: Phallometry Doesn’t Equal Pathology, 38 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 329, 329 (2009).
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Ryan C. W. Hall & Richard C. W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition,
Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82
MAYO CLINIC PROC. 457, 458 (2007).
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Ray Blanchard et al., Pedophilia, Hebephilia and the DSM-V, 38 ARCHIVES SEXUAL
BEHAV. 335, 335 (2009).
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sexually assaulted pubescent victims and have responded most strongly to laboratory
stimuli depicting pubescent more so than those depicting prepubescents and
adults.153 Consequently, the authors report the DSM-IV-TR shortcomings in
diagnosing paraphilias and offer recommendations such as replacing the diagnosis of
pedophilia with pedohebephilia and allowing clinicians to specify subtypes, i.e.,
Sexually Attracted to Children Younger than 11 (Pedophilic Type), Sexually
Attracted to Children ages 11-14 (Hebepihlic Type), or Sexually Attracted to Both
(Pedohebephilic Type).154
Blanchard’s study has come under scrutiny by scholars for various reasons.155
First, there is a contention that the term hebephilia as diagnosed under paraphilia
NOS is not widely accepted nor is there a professional consensus among practicing
clinicians of such a diagnosis. Secondly, there is a lack of consistent research
supporting the diagnosis. Thirdly, specific to the study, scholars have noted a
methodological limitation including the absence of models aged fifteen to eighteen
(mid to late adolescence) among the phallometric stimuli.156 Therefore, the authors
of the study could not determine whether the adult offenders, who were aroused to
early-stage adolescence, might also be equally or more aroused to mid to late aged
adolescents. Accordingly, the judgment to assign behavior as pathological should
not be based on phallometric data alone, rather it should also consider the extent to
which the behavior is abnormal in one’s particular culture.157
Other empirical data has refuted the perception that hebephiles are sexually
deviant. In particular, research has revealed heterosexual men to be sexually aroused
by adolescents158 and that both pedophiles and a control group could be distinguished
in their sexual arousal to prepubescent stimuli but both groups showed similar
arousal patterns to stimuli in the hebephilic age range.159 Further, research has
revealed no evidence of deviant sexual arousal patterns among either rapists or
heterosexual hebephiles.160
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Id.

155
Zander, supra note 144; see Gregory DeClue, Should Hebephilia Be a Mental
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al. (2008), 38 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 319, 319 (2009); Richard Green, Sexual Preference
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BEHAV. 477, 477 (1984).
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Others question the diagnosis of hebephilia as it may not be abnormal for men to
be attracted to the adolescent age group in various cultures.161 Surveys of social
organizations of persons acknowledging erotic interest in children, samples of sex
offenders, and surveys from the general population have revealed that attraction to
children of pubescent ages is more often reported than is the attraction to those of
prepubescent ages.162
These clinicians who opposed the hebephilia diagnosis say it will lack interrater
reliability and validity as a diagnosis since it is not a formally recognized diagnosis
in the DSM-IV-TR. These examiners often will cite that the DSM-IV-TR provided a
number of commonly known paraphilias such as coprophilia, urophilia, and
zoophilia, but neglect other paraphilic conditions such as hebephilia, which is likely
more prevalent amongst the general population and within sex offender populations
than these other paraphilias.
An area of heightened debate is whether pedophilia, hebephilia, and other
paraphilia diagnoses for that matter can be in remission.163 This question occurs
after an offender has been incarcerated for years and has not been exposed to a
victim pool (children in prison) and therefore has not demonstrated symptoms of the
disorder for years. One can argue that the remoteness of the offending period and
the offender’s current denial of emotional identification with children and sexual
fantasies and masturbatory practices towards children, etc., indicates that his
condition is in remission.
Recently, Paraphilias Sub-workgroup is proposing changes to the diagnosis of
pedophilia to be called pedohebephilic disorder in which the diagnosis includes
hebephilic type (sexually attracted to pubescent children—generally ages eleven
through fourteen).164
Before the advent of new-age sexually violent predator civil commitment laws,
the term hebephilia was not given much consideration by experts or the courts. In
fact it has been suggested that the term is proposed as a quintessential example of
pretextuality in which special interests promote a pseudoscientific construct that
advances an implicit instrumental goal (that of civil commitment by states). To this
date, there appears to be no clear professional consensus as to the clinical application
of hebephilia.
This author contends that adult sexual arousal in response to pubescent and postpubescent females is not likely to be pathologically deviant.165 As others have
asserted, the DSM-IV-TR draws the distinction between pathological age-related
sexual preferences, as adult sexual arousal to prepubescents is considered to be
pathological and adult arousal to pubescents and postpubescents is considered to be
nonpathological. Put simply, hebephilia is not in the DSM-IV-TR currently as a
listed paraphilia, and the paraphilia NOS category in the DSM-IV-TR does not
161
See Franklin, supra note 155; Freund & Costell, supra note 158; Moser, supra note 144,
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include evidence suggesting that it is intended to include hebephilia as a paraphilia.
Since hebephilia is absent from the DSM-IV-TR, its reliability and validity as a
diagnosis is negated. Along these lines, sexual attraction to adolescent females or
males, for that matter, is not a rare form of behavior. Scientific research, as outlined
above, is imprecise in its attempt to pathologize sexual attraction to adolescents.
G. Volition and the DSM
In conclusion, the assessment of volition is a legal decision. A diagnosis of
sexual deviance through a paraphilia by itself cannot be used to infer volitional
impairment. Further, the lack of interrater reliability and validity of various
paraphilias listed in the DSM-IV-TR, and whether other paraphilias not even
mentioned in the manual, can be formally used as diagnoses are at question in civil
commitment proceedings. Alternatively, the intensity, frequency, and severity of the
sexual urges for example are essential to consider when assessing sex offending and
volition.
The expert must remember that diagnostic labels should not be considered
dispositive of a legal issue.166 This is a useful premise to keep in mind because the
reliability of diagnoses by clinicians is quite poor in SVP proceedings. For example,
the interrater reliability of eight DSM-IV diagnoses applied by experts to determine
whether a client has a “mental abnormality that predisposes him to sexual violence”
was found to be poor to fair in a study of civil commitment proceedings in Florida.167
The expert witness must also be mindful of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) which states that the inclusion of
diagnostic categories such as pedophilia does not imply that the conduct meets legal
criteria for what constitutes mental disease and may not be wholly relevant to legal
determinations.168 There is an imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate
concern to the law and the information obtained in the clinical diagnosis. The DSM
includes, “[i]n determining whether an individual meets a specified legal standard . .
. additional information is usually required beyond that contained in the DSM-IV
diagnosis. This might include information about the individual’s functional
impairments and how these impairments affect the particular abilities in question.”169
When applying diagnoses such as pedophilia to questions of volition, the DSMIV states, “even when diminished control over one’s behaviors is a feature of the
disorder, having the diagnosis in itself does not demonstrate that a particular
individual is (or was) unable to control his or her behavior at a particular time.”170
Rather, the intensity, frequency, and severity of the deviant sexual drive leading to
dysfunction are the issues in civil commitment proceedings.
As mentioned previously, the law answers the question of what legal threshold is
required to assess whether a sex offender lacks enough serious difficulty refraining
166
Christopher Slobogin, Gary B. Melton & C. Robert Showalter, The Feasibility of a Brief
Evaluation of Mental State at the Time of the Offense, 8 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 305 (1988).
167

See Levenson, supra note 40, at 357.
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Id. The fact than an individual’s presentation meets the criteria for a diagnosis does not
carry any necessary implication regarding his degree of control over the behaviors that may be
associated with the disorder.
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from sex offending behaviors in order to be committed. However, the law is often
guided by the science and vice versa, therefore, the expert witness may wish to
consider the following elements (not in isolation) relevant to assessing an offender’s
volitional impairment despite their lack of empirical support:
1) Historically and currently meets criteria for a paraphilia diagnosis and
preferably multiple paraphilias;
2) Frequent acts of sexual violence within a closely proximate period of
time when at risk in the community (while on supervision or while
participating in outpatient sex offender treatment programming);
3) Offender sexually reoffends while he is participating in a sex offender
treatment program;
4) Offender engages in behavior when he is aware of a high probability of
getting apprehended;
5) Offender actively grooms a victim in the presence of an adult;
6) Sexual offending while in prison or awaiting civil commitment
hearings;
7) Multiple victims;
8) Offender lacks insight and understanding into his offending behavior;
9) Offender lacks control of his behavior when it is unreasonable to expect
him to engage or not engage in a certain act under his particular
circumstances (considering context of offender’s offending patterns);
10) Offender sexually acts out to relieve overwhelming anxiety and distress;
11) Offender’s strength of sexual desire interferes with his ability to
consider alternative courses of action and decision/ability not to offend;
12) Offender consistently utilizes child pornography, including collecting
great numbers of images, i.e., thousands to tens of thousands,
categorizes them into various meaningful categories, and spends a
significant amount of time viewing them on the computer, i.e., ten hours
per day.
When considering this vague and unoperational statutory language as to whether
an offender has “serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child
molestation if released,” courts will accept clinical testimony as long as it is derived
and presented in good faith as to mental abnormality.171
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H. Recent AWA Case Law on Legal Mental Illness
Since the implementation of the AWA, there have been relatively recent cases
addressing psychiatric diagnoses in civil commitment proceedings, usually
pertaining to whether a defendant meets the legal threshold of “serious difficulty in
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released.”
One recent AWA sexually violent predator civil commitment case, United States
v. Abregana, included the consideration of hebephilia as a mental disorder under the
statute.172 The defendant Abregana exposed his genitals to a twelve year-old boy in
a movie theater. Abregana then sent sixteen diskettes containing child pornography
to an undercover U.S. Postal Inspector. The disks included 221 images of
prepubescent, adolescent, and teenage boys engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
Upon executing a search warrant at his residence, agents found five discs which
contained child pornography including pictures of Abregana engaged in oral sex
with a fifteen year-old boy. Abregana was sentenced to prison and was subsequently
released and violated supervision, and admitted to having sexual contact with a
seventeen year-old minor during his supervision in which the boy touched
Abregana’s penis through his clothing and on another occasion Abregana
masturbated the minor’s penis. Abregana was placed in custody and began a second
term of supervised release. He again violated supervision by viewing pornography
and contacting three minors through email. He had accessed photos of nude males,
some sexually explicit, and he created a profile on an online chat-room claiming to
be fourteen years of age. He sent emails to male youth who were ten, twelve, and
fourteen years of age. Prior to his completion of his federal sentence, the Bureau of
Prisons certification review panel certified him as a sexually dangerous person.173
The federal court heard testimony from three sex offender psychologist
experts.174 The government’s expert diagnosed Abregana with hebephilia under the
paraphilia NOS diagnostic category due to his sexual arousal to post-pubescent
adolescents, i.e., teenagers or minors having secondary sex characteristics. The
defense expert testified that Abregana had an attraction to adolescents but noted that
hebephilia is not listed as a sexual deviance disorder in the DSM-IV-TR.175 The
other defense expert agreed with the government’s diagnosis of hebephilia.176 This
expert recognized the controversy over whether hebephilia is a valid diagnosis.
While acknowledging that hebephilia is not included in the DSM-IV-TR, he agreed
that there are authorities in the field who consider it a mental disorder and it has been
part of the literature for a number of decades.177 However, the expert testified that
the degree of pathology of hebephilia is much less than that of other paraphilias,
such as pedophilia or sexual sadism.178
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In its opinion, the federal trial court opined that the government had not proven
that Abregana “suffers from a serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a
result of which he would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent
conduct or child molestation if released.”179 The court found that Abregana suffered
from a mental disorder, namely paraphilia NOS hebephilia, yet based on the expert
evidence, hebephilia did not constitute a serious mental disorder.180
In another recent federal civil commitment case, United States v. Shields,181 the
court ruled that the government had not provided persuasive expert evidence that the
offender has a mental illness, abnormality, or disorder named hebephilia.182 The
court reasoned that while the peer-reviewed literature may establish that hebephilia
is generally accepted in the field as a group identifier or label, it does not establish
that hebephilia is generally accepted as a mental disorder by professionals who
assess sexually violent offenders.183 The court recognized that both sides agreed that
the attraction of an adult male to a pubescent adolescent is not, without more,
indicative of a mental disorder.184 The court acknowledged the state experts’
opinions that hebephilia included abnormal behavior; however, it found that the
government did not point to any peer-reviewed literature recognizing either experts’
diagnostic definition of a mental disorder called hebephilia.185 The court ruled,
“[s]ignificantly, the American Psychiatric Association considered and rejected
hebephilia as a diagnostic category for a mental disorder. [] Moreover, there is no
expert testimony in this record that psychiatric experts generally accept this
definition of hebephilia as a mental disorder.”186
Another federal district court case addressing psychiatric diagnosis and
hebephilia in particular is United States v. Carta.187 In Carta, the federal
government sought to commit Todd Carta.188 After pleading guilty to child
pornographic charges in October 2002, Carta was sentenced to five years in federal
prison and three years of supervised release.189 Carta began sex offender treatment
within the Bureau of Prisons and withdrew in part due to his inability to curb his
sexual interest in the program’s younger participants.190 During sex offender
treatment, Carta described his sexual interest in children ages twelve to seventeen
179

Id. at 1159; 18 U.S.C.A § 4247(a)(6) (West 2006).
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Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
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United States v. Shields, No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13837 (D. Mass.
Feb. 26, 2008).
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and secondary interest in children ages seven to eleven.191 He admitted to storing up
to 20,000 images on his computer while spending up to fourteen hours per day
looking at child pornography prior to his arrest.192 He admitted to sexually abusing
minors on many occasions with his youngest victim being a child in diapers. His
primary victim age group by self-report was males between ages thirteen and
twenty-eight.193 Prior to his release date, the Bureau of Prisons certified that Carta
was a sexually dangerous person and began civil commitment proceedings.194 The
government expert diagnosed Carta with paraphilia NOS that was characterized by
hebephilia.195 The defense’s expert concluded that hebephilia was not a generally
accepted diagnosis in the mental health community and did not fit within the DSM
definition of paraphilia, lacked diagnostic criteria and could not be consistently
defined, that normal adults may find adolescents arousing, and that articles offered
by the government to support a hebephilia diagnosis were not legitimate peerreviewed research.196
The district court found that the government had not proved by clear and
convincing evidence that Carta was a sexually dangerous person and that hebephilia
was not a “serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder” under the statute.197 The
court acknowledged that hebephilia is not listed within the DSM category of
paraphilia NOS and is not otherwise found within the DSM.198 The court considered
whether classing hebephilia as a mental disorder was supported by research in the
field of psychology and whether it was generally accepted in the psychiatric and
psychological community, finding that there was some dispute in the field and it was
not generally recognized as serious mental illness.199
The court cited United States v. Shields and United States. v. Abregana in that the
only federal courts to have addressed the diagnosis of hebephilia in sexually
dangerous person cases have rejected it as a basis for commitment.200 The court
questioned why the DSM editors would limit examples of paraphilia NOS to rare
sexual fixations if the category was intended to include a sexual interest as common
as attraction to post-pubescent adolescents.201 The court recognized that research has
indicated that normal adult males experience sexual arousal to sexually developed
adolescents and subsequently the definition of hebephilia could pathologize normal
men.202 The court considered the difficulty in determining what age range qualifies
191
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as adolescence given that the age of consent varies across jurisdictions as well as to
the extent to which the difference in age between the adolescent and the adult affects
the diagnosis.203
Upon review of this district court’s decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision in Carta.204 To this date, this is
the only federal court of appeals case dealing with hebephilia. The appellate court
criticized the district court’s approach in considering hebephilia as qualifying for the
legal civil commitment criteria a “serious mental illness, abnormality, or
disorder.”205
The court believed Carta fell into the paraphilia diagnostic category in the
DSM.206 Specifically, the Court cited the paraphilia NOS category as a catch-all
category that lists various paraphilias.207 When applied to Carta, his past history of
sexually abusing minors, his decades-long sexual fixation on minors causing him
significant distress or impairment in his life, his in-prison behavior and expressed
attitudes seemingly justify classifying him as suffering from a paraphilia.208 The
court opined that it would be clear error to state that the DSM definition of paraphilia
excluded an intense sexual fixation on young teenagers similar to Carta’s offending
behaviors.209 While the district court did not want to stretch hebephilia into the
paraphilia NOS category because it could pathologize normal men, the appellate
court accepted hebephilia as a diagnosis simply pointing to adolescents as the target
of Carta’s fixation.
The court ruled that not everyone sexually attracted to adolescents is mentally
disordered, rather, those offenders whose urges are so strong as to produce the
symptoms and consequences identified in the DSM (similar to Carta), could be
classified with a paraphilia NOS, that was characterized by hebephilia.210 Finally,
the court suggested that the government’s position depended only on showing
whether Carta’s sexual attraction to teenagers fell within the DSM definition of
paraphilia NOS, not on showing that hebephilia is a mental disorder.211 The court
remanded the case back to the district court to consider whether Carta is a sexually
dangerous person.212
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I. Risk Assessment Instruments and Volition
A question remains as to whether actuarial risk assessment instruments should be
utilized in AWA commitment proceedings to provide for an assessment of “serious
difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation.”213
Actuarial risk assessment instruments identify predictive variables for a specific
outcome that are each assigned weight. The choice of data categories is driven by
empirical research which demonstrates what groups of individuals, because of
specific characteristics determining group membership, are at relatively higher risk.
Actuarial assessments estimate the absolute likelihood or specific probability that an
individual person will sexually/violently recidivate in the future on the basis of
retrospective studies of groups of sex offenders released into the community.214
Hence, group data define the individual one is evaluating.
But as mentioned before, the expert evaluating an AWA commitment claim must
realize there are different pathways to offending, and the sex offender specific
actuarial risk assessment instruments tap into these constructs, based primarily on
elements of sexual deviance and antisocial lifestyle.215 At this juncture, we have no
empirical data linking the actuarial items to volitional impairments. However, some
experts, and certainly U.S. attorneys, may assume that high actuarial scores
indicating high risk probability estimates are the best indicators of one’s serious
difficulty refraining from sexual violence. This is a major assumption and one that
is not likely supported by empirical data. Furthermore, the normative samples of the
Static 99 for example, included exhibitionist type noncontact offenders but did not
include online solicitation type offenders, common in federal court.216 Similarly, the
Static 99 cannot be used to assess risk amongst sole child pornography possessors.
There is a heightened standard of reliability and validity in risk assessment
evidence given the consequences of loss of liberty and protection of the community
from potential sexual violence.217 However, state courts handling sexually violent
predator (SVP) cases have consistently admitted clinical judgment testimony

213
As stated previously, the BOP has recommended the use of actuarial risk assessment
instruments, Static-99 and RRASOR, to aid in assessing an offender’s serious difficulty in
controlling his sex offending behaviors. They recommend a risk assessment method of
clinical adjustment to actuarial data. Overriding factors to continue pursuit of commitment
include Static-99 scores of six or greater and RRASOR scores of four or greater.
214

Howard, E. Barbaree, Calvin M. Langton & Edward J. Peacock, Different Actuarial
Risk Measurements Produce Different Risk Rankings for Sexual Offenders, 18 SEX ABUSE: J.
RES. & TREATMENT 423, 423 (2006); Anthony R. Beech, Dawn D. Fisher & David Thornton,
Risk Assessment of Sex Offenders, 34 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 339, 340 (2003); Michael
C. Seto, Is More Better? Combining Actuarial Risk Scales to Predict Recidivism Among Adult
Sex Offenders, 17 ASSESSMENT 156, 156 (2005).
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establishing low levels of reliability in the courtroom.218 There is little doubt that the
courts will allow actuarial testimony even when it is utilized to assess volitional
impairment.
The major questions state courts have considered regarding admissibility are the
instruments’ reliability and accuracy as products of science and the importance of
examiners and courts using them properly. Courts such as the one in In re R.S.,219
have upheld the reliability of actuarial risk assessment instruments as an aid in
predicting recidivism. However, they do not rely on them as litmus tests; rather,
they are interpreted as one piece of a broader clinical evaluation.
State appellate courts have considered the issues of evidentiary reliability of
these instruments. Two admitted actuarials220 and one denied their use,221 yet all
three courts accepted clinical judgment. The admissibility question surrounded not
how accurate the instruments are to justify liberty infringements, but rather how
accurate must they be to avoid potential prejudice arising from labeling actuarial
prediction a science.222 One court established that scientific reliability was
contextual and depended upon the complexity of the testimony and the likely impact
of the testimony on the fact-finding process.223
In People v. Taylor,224 the court rejected the use of actuarial instruments and
questioned the youthfulness of the instruments and opined that the validity of the
instruments has not been established. Trial judges in Arizona and Missouri state
commitment cases have held that the exclusion of actuarial risk testimony did not
prevent the introduction of clinical judgment risk assessments.225
In the case In re Valdez, a trial court in Florida granted an order to exclude
actuarials as it opined that they may define sexual violence differently from the
statute that is the basis of the legal proceedings. They fail to address the causal
nexus issue, they have potential for prejudice as they give a false impression that
they provide an accurate and reliable estimate about the ultimate legal issue of risk
assessment, they lack general acceptance, they lack probative value, and none of the
tests included whether an offender has been treated or is on supervision, and the
court stressed the instrument’s sole reliance on static factors.226
Federal district courts have allowed the use of actuarial risk assessment
instruments in federal sex offender cases, including AWA civil commitment cases.227
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Charles Patrick Ewing, Preventive Detention and Execution: The Constitutionality of
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In United States v. Shields,228 the U.S. District Court ruled that actuarial risk
assessments (RRASOR, STATIC-99) and any adjusted actuarial approach, including
the “guided clinical method” and the “adjusted actuarial method,” are reliable under
the standards set forth in Daubert.229 The court reasoned that these assessments are
generally accepted as a reliable methodology within the relevant scientific
community and they have been subject to peer review. Further, the court found that
experts in at least nineteen other states rely upon actuarial risk assessment in forming
their opinions on sex offenders’ risk of recidivism and only Illinois was found to rule
that some expert testimony based upon actuarial risk assessment was deemed
inadmissible on the question of sexual recidivism.230
Overall, the instruments must be evaluated for “fit” (their association to the
pertinent legal inquiry), and the prejudicial impact of actuarial risk assessment
instruments might be the most significant issue challenging their reliability. The
legal inquiry in AWA cases addresses the issue of “serious difficulty refraining,” and
federal courts must consider whether the instruments’ foundations and objectives
satisfy the legal fit issue for admissibility. One can consider that a high score
indicates that an offender is high risk and therefore he has serious difficulty
refraining, yet the actuarial instruments may appear to be a better fit with the
ambiguous term “likely” than the AWA volitional language.
Actuarial instruments will likely continue to be admitted into state and federal
courts due to their proclaimed accuracy and utility as they tout interrater reliability,
measurement error, predictive validity with future sexual violence, and have been
tested and published in peer review literature.231 Judges will continue to perceive
that they are probative to legal questions and will consider them as support to
experts’ clinical opinions. Additionally, the Bureau of Prisons also recommends that
psychologists practicing within the BOP who are performing AWA commitment
assessments, utilize risk assessment tools that are relied upon by professionals in the
field.232
Most experts who are asked to assess for future sexual violence utilize these
instruments in their risk assessments. However, experts, attorneys, and judges in
these cases must be aware of the strengths, weaknesses, and limitations of the
instruments. They must challenge their use when applying them to the statutory
language “serious difficulty refraining” in AWA cases.
We turn now to the dispositive answer to our volitional questions, namely how
the courts assess and interpret one’s volitional impairments as they relate to sex
offending behaviors.

228
United States v. Shields, No. 07-12056-PBS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13837, at *2 (D.
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Molestation if Released,” 72 Fed. Reg. 43, 209 (Aug. 3, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt.
549, subpart H).
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J. Distinguishing State and Federal Sex Offenders: Profiles of State Civilly
Committed Sex Offenders
One may ask what is the difference between the atypical sex offender appropriate
for indefinite civil commitment versus the dangerous but typical recidivist
considered in the holdings of Hendricks and Crane? A few states offer some
analysis of the demographic and clinical profiles of their committed offenders. In
Florida, researchers found that offenders who were of a nonminority race, carried
diagnoses and/or assessments of pedophilia and paraphilia NOS, had significant
evidence of psychopathy, had high actuarial risk assessment scores, offended against
a younger age victim, and had more total victims and offended against victims of
both genders were more likely to be civilly committed under the state’s Jimmy Ryce
Act.233
Another study in Arizona assessed commonalities amongst civilly committed sex
offenders in Arizona and found that they averaged 2.6 sex offense convictions and
85% had prior nonsexual offenses.234 Most of the offenders abused children
sexually, some abused both children and adults, and a small number of offenders
sexually offended against adults. About 90% of the Arizona sample had a history of
alcohol abuse, 68% marijuana abuse, and 42% cocaine abuse. About 63% had a
diagnosis of pedophilia, 56% paraphilia not otherwise specified, 14% exhibitionism,
13% voyeurism, and 40% antisocial personality disorder.235
A study examining Minnesota’s civil commitment detainees revealed that about
5% of all sex offenders released from the state’s prisons eventually were civilly
committed.236 About 46% of the detainees had four or more previous felony
convictions, 77% had two or more previous sex crimes, and 27% had four or more
previous sex crimes.237 About 37% of the detainees victimized adults, 37%
victimized children, and 25% victimized children aged ten to seventeen.238 About
51% of the detainees victimized acquaintances and only 13% were relatives of their
victims, while 7% had stranger victims.239 About 70% of the detainees offended
against females, 20% against males, and 10% had victims of both sexes.240 Most
often the detainees carried substance abuse diagnoses (52%), followed by Pedophilia

233
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(35%), and APD (26%).241 The authors of this study found that their civil detainees
were highly variable and heterogeneous in nature.242
K. Understanding the Federal Sex Offender
As of February 2007, the Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) Central Office Review Panel
had reviewed 2,386 inmates for potential 18 U.S.C. § 4248 civil commitment, and
only 22 inmates have been certified as sexually dangerous persons and were pending
civil commitment hearings.243
To date, the BOP has filed certificates on prisoners to be considered for civil
commitment who have diagnoses with pedophilia, paraphilia, antisocial personality
disorder, or a combination of those three diagnoses.244 Many have had sexual
paraphilia diagnoses including exhibitionism, voyeurism, fetishism, sexual sadism,
and frotterism, while others have had nonsexual disorder diagnoses including bipolar
disorder, borderline, depressive, or histrionic personality disorders.245
Many federal sex offenders differ from state sex offenders as they have
committed federal specific sex crimes. These federal sex offenses often are
noncontact sex offenses such as Internet solicitation and possession of child
pornography. Some federal sex offenders being considered for civil commitment
under the AWA will also have a history of state sex offense crimes prior to their
incarceration within the BOP.
Imperative to the language of the AWA, is the fact that any sex offender within
the BOP can be petitioned for commitment. For example, consider a one-time sex
offender who attempted to solicit a federal agent for sex believing she was thirteen
years-old; this can be defined as “attempting to engage in sexually violent conduct or
child molestation” and be deemed sexually dangerous to others and be subject to
commitment proceedings. However, this offender would not likely be considered as
having a serious difficulty in refraining from acts of sexual violence. In contrast, a
pornography possessor who has no hands-on sexual offenses, and who may have
attempted to solicit another with intent of a contact sex offense, could potentially be
committed indefinitely without ever physically assaulting anyone.
When considering the assessment of federal sex offenders, questions arise
including what are the risks of reoffending for pornography and solicitation
offenders. Does pornography possession lead to future contact and noncontact sex
offenses? Are pornography possession sex offenders pedophilic and present as high
risk sex offenders? Is there a difference between solicitors who have interacted with
241

Id. at 369.
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Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment Without Psychosis: The Law’s Reliance on the
Weakest Link in Psychodiagnosis, 1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIV. COMMITMENT: SCI. & L. 17
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real victims versus those whose offenses were against undercover law enforcement
officers?
L. Online Solicitation
Many federal sex crimes are noncontact and “hands-off” in nature. They often
include solicitation and pornography possession cases. These offenders are still
vulnerable to AWA commitment proceedings. The former crime includes the trendy
“catch a predator” cases in which an individual will solicit an underage person
through online Internet contact and attempt to meet the underage person at a certain
destination, only to find undercover police or federal law enforcement there to arrest
him. These online solicitation cases are policed by county or federal law
enforcement agency sting-type operations.
Each year, one in five youth encounter online solicitations via chat-rooms or
instant messaging routes that are sexual in nature. The National Juvenile Online
Victimization Survey has studied law enforcement investigations of Internet sex
crimes against minors. They have found that 25% of all arrests for Internet sex
crimes against minors were due to “proactive” investigations where police/federal
agents pose online as minors or pretend to be mothers teaching their children about
sex.246 These investigations allow law enforcement to catch suspects before they
have an opportunity to offend. Undercover investigations can be referred to as
“reactive” or “take over” when police learn of a solicitation to a real child victim and
then they pose as the original minor and target the suspect.
In the year 2000, one quarter (644) of the Internet sex crimes against juveniles
(about 2, 500 total arrests) were based on proactive investigation. Other arrests were
for crimes committed by the offenders who met the juveniles online (20%), other sex
crimes committed against juveniles by family members or acquaintances against
juvenile victims (19%), and the possession, distribution, or trading of pornography
on the Internet (36% of arrests).247
Because proactive and many reactive solicitation cases include no contact sex
offenses, these offenders’ characteristics and sexual dangerousness is questioned.
Offenders who attempted to target online (law enforcement) victims have a tendency
to be lower risk than those who targeted actual juvenile victims. Those who target
actual juvenile victims were more likely to have more prior arrests for non-sexual
offenses and for sexual offenses against minors, have a lower income, and were less
likely to be employed full-time at the time of the offense. Both groups had similarly
high rates of child pornography possession and drug and alcohol use patterns.248
Research has indicated that among sex offenders with Internet sex crimes
(solicitation with identified victims, solicitations with law enforcement, and
possessors of child pornography), about two-thirds have possessed child

246
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pornography, about 10% have prior arrests for sex offenses against minors, and 11%
had been known to be violent to any degree.249
M. Illegal Pornography Possessors
Many federal sex offenders have only child pornography possession and/or
distribution type cases in their sex offending history. Others will have contact sex
offenses in addition to their pornography type cases. In some cases, a sex offender
will have a history of possession of pornography and will entice a live victim to
engage in the production of pornographic material.
Researchers also suggest that Internet offenders may fall into three categories:
collecting pornography as part of a larger pattern of sexual offending; collecting to
feed a developing sexual interest in children; and accessing indecent images of
children out of curiosity.250 Importantly, the expert evaluating offenders with illegal
possession of child pornography must be able to distinguish higher risk offenders
with an affinity for child pornography and a significant deviant sexual drive towards
children versus the offender who “got caught up” in online trade and possession of
child pornography which was fueled in part by curiosity, social isolation, and need
for power.251
There is scant research on the criminal histories and later offending of child
pornography offenders. At least one study has indicated that offenders who accessed
child pornography often had no prior criminal background.252 Research data reveals
that child pornography offenders with prior criminal records were significantly more
likely to offend in various ways (general, violent, and sexual offenses).253 About a
quarter of the sample of pornography offenders had prior contact sex offenses and
15% had prior child pornography offenses.254 After an average time at risk of 29.7
249
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250
Joe Sullivan & Anthony Beech, Assessing Internet Sex Offenders, in CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE AND THE INTERNET: TACKLING THE NEW FRONTIER 69 (Martin C. Calder ed., 2004).
251

See RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY
ON
THE
INTERNET
(2006),
available
at
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/ric/Publications/ e04062000.pdf; Stephen Smallbone &
Richard Wortley, AUSTL. INST. CRIMINOLOGY, Child Sexual Abuse in Queensland: Offender
(2001),
Characteristics
&
Modus
Operandi,
http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/1/D/7/%7B1D7F5F5E-2B6A-44CA-B2CB9B330AE888A8%7Dti193.pdf. The authors acknowledge ten levels of image severity
including: Indicative, Nudist, Erotica, Posing, Erotic Posing, Explicit Erotic Posing, Explicit
sexual activity, Assault, Gross assault, Sadistic/bestiality. The authors report that before the
advent of the Internet, between 20% and 33% of those arrested for child pornography offenses
were involved with hands-on abuse. Further, they cite that 10% of those sex offenders with
child abuse victims had sought out and/or collected child pornography. See also A. Dobson,
Caught in the Net, CARE AND HEALTH 6, 6-9 (Feb. 13, 2003).
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months, 17% of the sample had reoffended.255 Only 9% of the contact sex offenders
committed a further contact sexual offense and 5% committed a further pornography
offense.256 In contrast, about 1% of the child pornography-only offenders escalated
to committing a contact sexual reoffense and 4% committed a further pornography
offense.257 Those child pornography offenders who had committed a prior or
concurrent contact sex offense were the most likely to offend again, either generally
or sexually. As expected, a history of contact sex offenses is predictive of future
hands-on sex offenses even with pornography type offenders.
Contemporary research by Wolak, Finkelhor, and Mitchell258 examined child
pornography possessors and trends in offender characteristics and found that only
9% had a prior arrest for a sex offense against a minor, 5% had been registered as a
sex offender at the time of the crime. About 45% of these offenders were dual
offenders charged with both child pornography and concurrent child sexual abuse.
One recent article examined the characteristics of Internet child pornography
offenders versus child molesters.259 The former group was significantly younger,
possessed lower psychopathic traits, had more psychological difficulties in
adulthood, and fewer prior sexual convictions than the child molester group.260
However, in one recent study, researchers found that child pornography offenses are
a valid diagnostic indicator of the diagnosis of pedophilia.261 In fact, offenders
charged with child pornography offenses were more sexually aroused
phallometrically towards children than were child molesters who had offended
against child victims.262 Whether this indicates that this group is more likely to
hands-on sexually reoffend is unclear.263
The characteristics of online sex offenders have been recently explored.264 The
researchers found that when comparing online to offline offenders, the former group
had more victim empathy and greater sexual deviancy, while both groups reported
significantly greater rates of childhood physical and sexual abuse than the general
population.
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In a meta-analytic study, the authors found that 12% of online sexual offenders
(particularly child pornography offenders) had an officially known contact sexual
offense history at the time of their index offense.265 Another meta-analysis revealed
that 4.6% of online offenders committed a new sexual offense of some kind during a
1.5 to 6-year follow-up period (2% committed a contact sexual offense and 3.4%
committed a new child pornography offense).266
Another recent study analyzed a group of offenders who were subsequently
charged with consumption of illegal pornographic material over a six year follow-up
period.267 The researchers found that 3% of the sample recidivated with a violent
and/or sex offense or with a hands-off sex offense (0.8%).268 They concluded that
consuming child pornography alone is not a risk factor for committing hands-on sex
offenses.269
N. Does Use of Pornography Escalate to Contact Sex Offending?
One critical issue to address in AWA civil commitment cases is the link between
child pornography possession and contact sex offenses. The AWA does not require
a hands-on offense and an offender can even be civilly committed due to one
possession or solicitation case. However, federal prosecutors may be prudent to
elect to petition for commitment of higher risk sex offenders with multiple sex
crimes and victims in their history as these offenders may have volitional
impairments.270
There are possible associations between pornography use and the sexual abuse of
children:
1) Child pornography use is an expression of existing sexual interests;
2) Child pornography is used to prime the individual to offend and
disinhibits deviant sexual behavior;
3) Child pornography has a corrosive effect (prolonged use of child
pornography includes increased use, increased attraction to images and
desensitized views of harm to victims);
4) Child pornography has a cathartic effect (viewing pornography is the
sole outlet for an individual’s attraction to children);
265
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5) Child pornography is a by-product of pedophilia and it reinforces
pedophilic arousal patterns;
6) Child pornography use dehumanizes children and encourages adult and
child sexuality;
7) Child pornography is utilized by certain offenders as a grooming tool.
Pornography use can escalate to the commission of hands-on contact offenses
through the processes of downloading and collecting of images, viewing of images,
distributing of images, and the fantasy and masturbation towards the images.271
Viewing of non-violent and violent pornography may increase aggression and rapemyth acceptance.272
Yet many studies do not reveal a causal link between use of pornography and
contact sex offenses.273 For example, a recent study in Switzerland analyzed the
association between the consumption of child pornography and subsequent hands-on
sex offenses in a sample of child pornography users and found low rates of hands-on
offending over a six year period.274 The authors studied 231 male offenders who
were charged with consumption of illegal pornographic material after being detected
by a special operation against Internet child pornography conducted by the Swiss
Police in 2002. The authors found that 4.8% of the sample of offenders had a prior
conviction for a sexual and/or violent offense and 1% for a hands-on sex offense
involving child sexual abuse, 3.3% for a hands-off sex offense and one for a
nonsexual violent offense. The authors found that only 3% of the study sample
recidivated with a violent and/or sexual offense, 3.9% recidivated with a hands-off
sexual offense, and 0.8% recidivated with a hands-on sex offense over a six year
follow-up period. The authors concluded that consuming child pornography alone is
not a risk factor for committing hands-on sex offenses and the prognosis for handson sex offenses as well as for child pornography recidivism is favorable.275 These
results are similar to previously mentioned meta-analysis276 finding that 2.0% of
271
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online offenders committed a future hands-on sex offense over a 1.5 to 6 year
follow-up period.
Another study examined the association between child
pornography consumption and the subsequent perpetration of hands-on sex
offenses.277 In their sample of convicted child pornography consumers (24% who
had been also convicted for a hands-on sex offense against a minor), Seto and Eke
found a recidivism rate of 1.3% for hands-on sex offenses and 5.3% for hands-off
sex offenses in a follow-up time of two and a half years.278
Other data appear inconclusive as Howitt investigated convicted hands-on sex
offenders who reported that the source of sexual stimuli did not stem solely from
child pornography material, but from the cognitive manipulation of legal adult
pornography or from seeing arousing images in newspapers and magazines usually
not involving nudity.279 The author concluded that it is not possible to establish an
association between hands-on sex offenses and the consumption of illegal child
pornography.
Some child molesters commit a contact sex offense against a child in order to
have proximity with the child to produce pornographic material with the goal of
viewing and/or distributing. Viewing child pornography and masturbating towards
images may be a substitute for a hands-on sex offense against a child. In fact, one
author studied men who were attracted to male child pornography and found that
they self-reported that viewing child pornography was a substitute for hands-on
offending and it did not lead to an increase in seeking out boys to satisfy sexual
needs.280
Conversely, other research has revealed that offenders who view child
pornography exhibit greater sexual arousal to children than adults and differed from
a group of sex offenders who had contact-offense child victims.281 Small groups of
sex offenders, perhaps about 10%, have admitted using pornography as an element
to the preparation of a hands-on sex offense or as part of the sex offense itself.282
Most likely, those sex offenders with many risk factors to reoffend may be more
vulnerable in utilizing pornography as a catalyst to their hands-on offending patterns.
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However, Marshall found that 53% of his sample of child molesters deliberately
used pornographic stimuli as part of their planned preparation for offending.283
Kingston and colleagues examined convicted hands-on sex offenders and found
that the consumption of illegal pornography was a relevant risk factor and that
offenders who had consumed illegal pornography were more likely to reoffend
irrespective of their risk level of recidivism.284
Additionally, a recent study indicated that 17% of sex offenders (incest
offenders, offenders against children, offenders against adults, and exhibitionists)
utilized pornography in their sex offenses, and of the users, 13% used pornography
to stimulate themselves to commit a hands-on sex crime, 55% showed pornographic
material to their victims, and 36% took pictures, mostly of child victims.285 About
25% of the extrafamilial offenders against boys and 29% of the incest offenders
against girls utilized pornography during the commissions of their crimes.286
The National District Attorney’s Association (NDAA) published a paper in 2004
citing recent studies suggesting that there is a significant link between viewing child
pornography and molesting children.287 According to the U.S. Postal Inspection
Service, at least 80% of purchasers of child pornography are active hands-on
offenders of children and about 40% of the child pornographers who were
investigated in a several year period had sexually abused children.288 From January
of 1997 through March of 2004, 1,807 child pornographers were arrested and 620 of
them were confined child molesters.289 About 35% of these child pornographers
were actual child molesters defined as an offender who had confessed to acts of child
molesting or who had a record for molestation, or who were involved in an overt act
in order to procure children for sexual purposes. The 620 confirmed child molesters
led to 839 child victims who were identified and rescued.290
The NDAA cites other studies suggesting a link between child pornography and
hands-on sex offending. Reports by state-based Internet Crimes Against Children
(ICAC) task forces confirm a positive connection between the possession of child
283
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pornography and the commission of crimes against children.291 In fact, the
Pennsylvania ICAC task force found that 51% of offenders arrested for pornography
related offenses were last determined to be actively molesting children or to have
molested them in the past.292 In Dallas, the ICAC task force found that 32% of the
offenders arrested over the course of one year for child pornography offenses were
also molesting children or had molested them in the past.293
In another study of thirteen men convicted of downloading child pornography off
the Internet, Quayle and Taylor found that there was a relationship between use of
child pornography and achieving sexual arousal.294 They also found that some of the
offenses used the child pornography as collectibles in that pleasure was obtained
from collecting pictures a part of a series.295
When considering child molester and rapist groups, both have similar rates of
exposure to pornography in the home or during their developmental years.
However, child molesters are more likely than rapists to utilize pornography in
adulthood and use materials prior to and during their offenses.296 Those child
molesters, who had been sexually assaulted during childhood and when the
perpetrator used pornographic materials, were more likely to have followed similar
behavior patterns during their sex offenses as perpetrators. Child molesters are more
likely to utilize pornography to relieve the impulse to commit a sex offense than are
rapists.297
Unpublished and published data have indicated that about one third of men who
use child pornography have previously committed sexual offenses against
children.298
The National Juvenile Online Victimization Study data has revealed that 40% of
the cases involving child pornography possession included “dual offenders” who not
only possessed illegal pornography but victimized a child in the same
investigation.299 While 27% of dual offenders showed or gave child pornography to
children in a grooming type fashion, 9% of the dual offenders sent child
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pornography to undercover officers posing as juveniles.300 Interestingly, 25% of the
dual offenders admitted to grooming (interest a victim in or overcome inhibitions
about sexual activity).301 Further data reveal that child pornography offenders who
organized their collections or who distributed pornography differed from other
offenders in being more likely to have 1,000 more images of child pornography and
images of children under age six.302 However, no studies have supported the effect
of child pornography use and hands-on offending even with this more deviant
group.303
When considering this information, it is speculative to assume that possession of
pornography is a causative factor to hands-on offending. A mental health
professional examining such a case should look at patterns of sex offending
behavior, view the images himself to understand what stimulates the sex offender,
and distinguish the period of time the offender possessed and viewed the images.
Despite these efforts, the federal prosecutor may continue to push commitment
proceedings on sex offenders who have multiple pornography type crimes believing
that noncontact sex offenders too can have serious difficulty refraining from their
illegal sex acts. Additionally, they may wish to target sex offenders who possess
“hardcore” abusive type pornography due to its heinousness and marked deviance.
Whether an expert can reliably provide a risk assessment for future contact and
noncontact sex offenses relevant to an offender with only child pornography
possession in his record has yet to be seen. Furthermore, whether actuarial risk
assessment instruments which are geared to assessing future hands-on sex crimes can
be adequately used with pornography possession offenders is unclear.
O. Undetected Sex Offenses
Another topic that will likely flood AWA commitment hearings is the question of
undetected sex offenses among sex offender groups. This matter is relevant due to
research data that arose from the BOP Butner sex offender treatment facility
implying that many of the pornography type sex offenders admitted to numerous
hands-on type sex offenses during their disclosures in treatment.304
Dr. Hernandez, Director of the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) at
Federal Correctional Institution-Butner, has presented data regarding 155 sexual
offenders in a voluntary intensive residential sex offender-specific treatment
program at a medium-security federal prison. At the time of sentencing, 115 (74%)
of the offenders had no documented hands-on victims. Twenty-six percent had
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known histories of abusing a child via a hands-on sexual act. The number of victims
known at the time of sentencing was 75 (an average of 1.88 victims) per offender.305
By the end of the eighteen month residential treatment program, 24 (15%) of the
subjects denied they committed hands-on sexual abuse and 131 (85%) admitted they
committed at least one hands-on sexual offense indicating a 59% increase in the
number of subjects with known hands-on offenses.306 The number of reported
victims known at the end of treatment among all offenders was 1,777, an average of
13.56 victims per offender307 and an increase of 2,369% in the number of hands-on
sexual contact offenses acknowledged.308 The 40 subjects who had known histories
of hands-on offending at the time of sentencing disclosed an average of 19.4 victims
during their treatment period, while the 115 subjects with no known histories of
hands-on sex offenses disclosed an average of 8.7 victims.309 Further, the authors
found that the majority of participants reported that they committed acts of hands-on
abuse prior to seeking child pornography on the Internet and consequently, the
Internet is a causal factor in contact sex offenses.310 Specifically, the authors argue
that the results of their study suggest that many Internet child pornography offenders
may be undetected child molesters and their use of child pornography demonstrates
their paraphilic orientation.311
In defense of their study, the authors site that despite the motivations of the
offenders to volunteer for the treatment program, most of the offenders were not
parole eligible and therefore their participation would not affect their release date.
Additionally, the authors found that polygraph studies among half of the offender
group did not indicate over-reporting with any subject.312
The authors found that a significant number of Internet sex offenders in their
sample admitted to committing hands-on sexual abuse, which in part was facilitated
by their participating in the treatment program.313 The authors surmise that few if
any offenders would have admitted to the initially undisclosed hands-on offenses if it
were not for the treatment program.314 Further, the authors contend that the study
supports the belief that child pornography offenders are involved in more than
collecting pictures, but many are committing hands-on assaults.315 Finally, the
authors conclude that child pornography for some offenders reinforces pedophilic
arousal patterns, desensitizes them to the harm inflicted to the victims, normalizes
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child/adult sexual relations, dehumanizes children, and disinhibits deviant sexual
behavior.316
In another study, Hernandez studied ninety inmates who had been treated
through the same sex offender treatment program.317 Specifically, Hernandez
summarized that sixty-two of the ninety offenders were convicted of Internet-related
sexual offenses such as possession and distribution of pornography as well as
interstate travel with the intent to meet a child (solicitation). At the time of
sentencing, those sixty-two offenders were known to have committed contact sexual
offenses against a total of fifty-five victims. Following the treatment, the same
group reported committing contact sex offenses against an additional 1,379 victims.
About 42% of the offenders were known contact sexual offenders at the time of
sentencing, yet 76% reported contact sexual crimes.318 Importantly, Hernandez’s
studies have been questioned due to their statistical underpinnings and potential
manipulation of inmates in treatment to report sex crimes.
Underscoring this issue of undetected sex crimes, data from the National Crime
Victimization Survey reported 260,300 incidents of attempted or completed rapes;
however, those crimes actually reported to police were 97,460, suggesting that only
37% of the sexual crimes were reported to law enforcement.319 Only about half of all
reported rapes were cleared by arrest and only about 19% of the rapes and attempted
rapes reported to the National Crime Victims Survey were cleared by arrest.320 Data
suggests that the observed rates including arrests and reports to law enforcement
highly underestimate the actual rates of sexual offending. This data can be used by
the government to suggest that sex offenders, in general, commit more offenses on
average than might be suspected.
III. CONCLUSION
The Adam Walsh Act provides the most punitive and far reaching sex offender
legislation in this country’s history. This Article has focused on one element of this
law, namely the civil commitment of federal sex offenders.
While the federal government appears to be exercising its police powers, it also
enacted the commitment scheme while preserving U.S. Supreme Court landmark
holdings in Kansas v. Hendricks and Kansas v. Crane. Many state commitment laws
focus on the assessment of an offender’s mental abnormality and/or personality
disorder and a finding of likelihood of future offending. Many jurisdictions ignore
the holding in Crane, and some judges will not allow the expert to comment on the
volitional requirement, nor do they mandate the communication of this condition to
the trier of fact. Simply, trial court judges adhere to legislative statutory language
without considering U.S. Supreme Court case law. Positively, the AWA civil
316
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commitment format follows the volitional spirit articulated in Crane and experts
should testify to this volitional issue.
Similar to state commitment proceedings and pursuant to the decision in
Hendricks, the forensic evaluators must assess, and the courts must determine,
which federal sex offenders are atypical and subject to commitment, versus which
ones are typical recidivists who have served their criminal sentences and need to be
released. Proving whether a person has a volitional impairment—”serious difficulty
refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released”—should be
a very difficult issue to prove as most criminal and sexual offenders exercise
significant control over their behaviors. Experts should never solely equate
psychiatric diagnoses or scores from actuarial instruments with volitional
impairments, nor should they confuse the term “likely” with inability to
“refrain/control.” Accordingly, there is no scientific basis for distinguishing whether
an act is a function of freewill or an irresistible type impulse.321 Rather, one’s
serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct is a moral question to
ultimately be decided by the trier of fact with aid from the expert witness.
This point outlines a main theme in the Crane holding that distinguishes typical
recidivists from those repeat sex offenders who simply cannot control their
behaviors. The Crane decision assumes that those offenders being considered for
commitment have more than one prior sex offense conviction, and that one time sex
offenders are not appropriate for commitment.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Crane essentially differentiated a typical sex offender
from one who should be civilly committed by incorporating an abstract “freewill”
doctrine. It is easy for an expert witness to simply say an offender lacks control over
his behaviors, yet, they need to utilize an assessment process that attempts to dissect
this offender’s offending patterns to satisfactorily answer the question. Pursuant to
the objectives of the AWA commitment act, the expert must specify his sex offender
risk assessment to the federal sex offender, one who often has a history of child
pornography and/or solicitation type cases.
The fields of psychology and psychiatry readily admit they have serious
difficulties in answering this volitional impairment question.
Additionally,
numerous typical recidivists display multiple sex offenses and deviant sexual
interests. Many experts and juries assume that because an offender has a criminal
record of more than one sex offense, that the offender did not and does not have
control over his behavior. This hypothesis is flawed and simply not true in many
cases. The challenge in AWA civil commitment of sex offender cases is for the
expert to attempt to accurately differentiate the typical recidivist who chooses to
commit crimes and is willfully dangerous and unwilling to restrain himself, versus
the recidivist who cannot control his behaviors and who suffers from volitional
impairments.

321
See Calkins Mercado et al., supra note 70. Forensic experts examining civil
commitment cases do not have an objective working definition of “serious difficulty
controlling.”

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol60/iss2/3

58

